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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, we use methods from econometrics to empirically measure and
quantify how digital information influences industries and markets. Specifically, we
focus on two important areas of marketing: online reputation management, and
competition between online and o✏ine markets.
In the first part of the thesis, we study the impact of management review re-
sponses, a popular reputation management mechanism, on consumer ratings. To
do so, we exploit a di↵erence in managerial practice across two hotel review plat-
forms, TripAdvisor and Expedia: while hotels regularly respond to their TripAd-
visor reviews, they never do so on Expedia. Based on this observation we employ
a “di↵erence-in-di↵erences” design to identify the causal impact of management re-
sponses on ratings, and show that responding hotels see an average increase of 0.1
stars. We then turn to analyze the mechanisms behind this increase in ratings and
show that by responding to reviews, hotels attract consumers who are inherently
vi
more positive, and therefore more likely to leave good reviews.
In the second part of the thesis, we study peer-to-peer markets and their impact
on traditional industries. We do so by looking at Airbnb, a sharing economy pioneer
o↵ering short-term accommodation. We combine data from Airbnb and the Texas
hotel industry, and estimate the impact of Airbnb’s entry into the Texas market
on hotel room revenue. To identify Airbnb’s causal impact on hotel room revenue,
we use a “di↵erence-in-di↵erences” empirical strategy that exploits the significant
spatiotemporal variation in the patterns of Airbnb adoption across city-level markets.
We estimate that in Austin, where Airbnb supply is highest, the impact on hotel
revenue is roughly 8-10% for the most a↵ected hotels. Further, we find that a↵ected
hotels have responded by reducing prices, an impact that benefits all consumers, not
just participants in the sharing economy.
The results presented in this thesis have practical implications for firms seeking to
improve their operations and marketing strategies, platforms seeking to design better
and e cient marketplaces, and consumers who are often not aware of important
dynamics that can be helpful in their decision-making process.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Online markets
The rise of online marketplaces started two decades ago when the widespread dif-
fusion of the Internet allowed the creation of companies like eBay and Amazon –
interestingly, the former started as only a side hobby and the latter as an online
bookstore. Cut to twenty years later: eBay is a multibillion-dollar business with
operations localized in over 30 countries,1 and Amazon surpassed Walmart as the
most valuable retailer in the United States by market capitalization.2
Today, we can find online markets of any type, from goods and services (Alibaba,
Craiglist), to travel (TripAdvisor, Expedia), to finance (LendingClub, Prosper), to
deliveries (Instacart, Postmates). While these businesses have di↵erent purposes,
they all have a common theme: leveraging the Internet and information technology
to reshape the buyer–supplier relationship.
Online markets allow organizations to reach audiences at an unprecedented scale,
which reduces transaction costs and lower prices, and leads to e ciency gains. By
reducing entry costs for sellers, online markets allow individuals and small businesses
to compete with traditional firms. Online markets improve customer relationships
and the matching of buyers with sellers, and provide higher levels of personalization
to consumers.
1See http://pages.ebay.com/globaltrading/buyer/index.html.
2See http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/technology/inside-amazon-wrestling-big-
ideas-in-a-bruising-workplace.html.
2For researchers, the rise of online markets has provided opportunities to test eco-
nomic theories and to study new issues that surround these platforms. First, online
markets are often very di↵erent in their designs, and therefore have di↵erent chal-
lenges to solve. For example, companies like eBay allow sellers to set up auctions for
their products, while others, like Uber, centrally set prices. Second, online markets
are generating impressive amounts of data, allowing researchers to study economic
issues at an unprecedented scale.
We discuss some of the broader economic challenges raised by online markets in
the next subsections.
1.1.1 Market design
The first set of challenges relates to the design of online markets. The purpose of
online markets is to create transactions between a large number of buyers and sellers.
However, to do this e↵ectively requires solving important market design problems
such as how to match buyers and sellers, how to set competitive pricing, or how to
establish trust between buyers and sellers.
The first problem is how to e ciently match buyers and sellers. Matching can
be done for example, by using a centralized mechanism like Uber does. When Uber
customers look for a ride, they can specify the type of service they want (e.g., a Black
Car, or an SUV), but not the exact driver. Matching buyers with sellers can also be
done in a decentralized way by allowing the buyers to specify what they want, and
then presenting them with the results. Amazon and Airbnb are two online markets
that use this mechanism for matching. In this case, the rank order in which the
results are presented to the buyer is important because it can determine the price
that a seller can charge for a product (Armstrong et al., 2009; Armstrong and Zhou,
2011). The rank order can also a↵ect the number of successful transactions (Fradkin,
2014; Horton, 2014).
3Another market design problem is that online markets need to set prices, and
in doing so, they have to take into account supply and demand, and competition.
Depending on the type of market, prices can be set in a centralized fashion (Uber or
Lyft) or in a decentralized way (eBay, Airbnb). A pricing mechanism that adjusts
well to market conditions can increase the overall welfare of the market. For example,
when TaskRabbit, an online market that matches laborers with demands for services,
switched from an auction mechanism to a simple hourly wage solution, it gave buyers
an easier and more convenient way to hire suppliers of services (Cullen and Farronato,
2014).
Finally, online markets must be able to guarantee that there is an adequate level
of trust between buyers and sellers by developing mechanisms to infer product and/or
seller quality. Since most the mechanisms through which cooperation is promoted in
o✏ine settings do not work as well in online settings (Kollock, 1999), online markets
rely on publicly available reviews and ratings to create such trust (Dellarocas, 2003).
Using reviews, traders are able to publicly post information about past transactions,
providing valuable information to future market participants.
Reviews and ratings are a fundamental part of any online marketplace. They
not only allow many online markets to operate by promoting good behavior, and,
therefore, facilitating transaction among strangers, but they can also a↵ect sales and
prices, thereby determining the success or failure of the companies participating in
these markets (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006; Luca, 2011; Melnik and Alm, 2002).
In online markets, where transactions heavily rely on reputation, companies make
substantial e↵orts to maintain a good reputation by developing strategies that can
help mitigate negative shocks to their ratings. Among these strategies, the practice
to publicly respond to buyers reviews has become a common way to address service
failures or simply thanking reviewers for taking the time to write a review. While
4service failure and recovery in traditional retail stores have received a lot of attention
in the past (Tax et al., 1998; Smith et al., 1999), little is known about how such
mechanisms will work in online markets. In Chapter 2, we add to this area of research
by studying the impact of review responses on ratings (Proserpio and Zervas, 2015),
and show how responding to reviews increases the satisfaction of future guests, which
translates to higher ratings.
1.1.2 Competition
The second set of challenges relates to the e↵ects of online markets on traditional
companies. Today consumers can go online and compare products between hun-
dreds of vendors with much less e↵ort than in the physical world. According to
traditional economic theory, this should reduce search costs for consumers, which in
turn should lead to lower and more homogeneous prices, and make markets more
competitive (Stahl, 1989).
Two strands of research have addressed the question of price competition between
online and traditional markets. The first strand measured the patterns of competition
by examining the degree of price dispersion between online markets and bricks and
mortar retailers. The findings di↵er from what the economic theory predicts. Studies
found that there was a large price dispersion among online retailers, and prices
were only modestly lower, and sometimes higher than the prices of their o✏ine
counterpart. For example, the work by Lee (1998) and Bailey (1998) showed that
prices were actually higher online than for o✏ine stores. Brynjolfsson and Smith
(2000) found the prices for books and CDs to be lower online than in o✏ine stores,
but they found large price dispersion among online retailers.
The second strand of research that addressed price competition measured the
consumer price sensitivity. Goolsbee (2001) found that there was a larger cross-price
elasticity for online computer retailers compared with o✏ine retailers. Looking at
5the insurance market, Brown and Goolsbee (2000) found that the increase in the
number of online markets reduced the prices of term life insurance by 8 to 15%,
increasing consumer surplus by $115-215 million per year.
The findings from this strand of research indicate the online markets are compet-
itive since that demand for a service and product depends both on the seller’s price
and the price of the competitors.
Overall, research has provided empirical evidence that online markets create new
competition, and that this competition can benefit buyers in terms of larger choice
of products and services, lower search costs, and sometimes, lower prices.
Following this body of research, in Chapter 3 we study a new set of online markets
collectively known as the sharing economy. These online markets recently emerged
as alternative suppliers of products and services provided by well-established indus-
tries. By looking at the accommodation sector, we empirically measure the extent
of competition between hotel stays and Airbnb stays (Zervas et al., 2015b).
We now proceed to introduce the two areas of research to which this thesis con-
tributes, and present our empirical findings.
1.2 Online reviews and reputation management
All markets need a minimum amount of trust between participants in order to operate
e ciently (Akerlof, 1970). However, in online markets, where transactions are largely
anonymous and geographically dispersed, building trust can prove to be challenging.
To incentivize trustworthiness, most online markets started using online feedback,
or reputation, mechanisms (Resnick et al., 2000), in which individuals share opin-
ions and experiences on a wide range of topics, including companies, products, and
services. In the last few years, these mechanisms have become the de facto standard
for promoting cooperation among strangers in online markets, by ensuring that the
6behavior of a trader becomes publicly known. Ultimately, this can a↵ect the future
behavior of the entire marketplace toward that trader.
Online reviews and feedback mechanisms have gained a lot of credibility in the
eyes of consumers and have spread to almost every industry sector. For example,
TripAdvisor, a popular travel-related content website, hosts almost 300 million re-
views about millions of lodging properties and is visited by over 350 million unique
users monthly;3 Yelp, a review platform for restaurants, hosts 90 million reviews and
is visited by approximately 90 million unique users monthly.4 Consumers now turn
to Yelp to find new restaurants, TripAdvisor to plan a vacation, and Amazon to
purchase products ranging from a book to a vacuum cleaner.5 Simply by clicking on
a button, consumers are able to share experiences, provide recommendations, and
obtain information about the quality of services and products at an unprecedented
scale.
The rise in popularity of online reviews has completely changed the relationship
between companies and consumers. Before the introduction of online reviews, com-
panies managed their image and reputation by controlling the information available
about the company through good publicity campaigns and strategically placed press
advertisements. Today, this paradigm has changed; consumers use online platforms
to give their opinion about the quality of products they bought, and the services
they used. These opinions then influence other consumers in their decision-making
process.
This shift from companies to consumers suggests that user-generated reviews
might be able to influence markets by a↵ecting brand popularity and product sales at
3See: http://www.tripadvisor.com/PressCenter-c4-Fact_Sheet.html.
4See: http://www.yelp.com/factsheet.
5See: http://www.mintel.com/press-centre/social-and-lifestyle/seven-in-10-
americans-seek-out-opinions-before-making-purchases or http://www.invespcro.com/
blog/the-importance-of-online-customer-reviews-infographic/.
7large. Indeed, a growing body of research demonstrated that online reviews, and more
generally user-generated content, have a large causal impact on economic outcomes,
ranging from restaurant sales to book prices to hotel bookings. For example, Luca
(2011) showed that a one-star increase in Yelp rating led to a 5-9% increase in
restaurant revenue, while Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) showed that an increase in
book ratings on Amazon led to an increase in sales.
Since online reviews can significantly influence the overall success of a company,
it is important for them to maintain a good reputation. To do so, companies often
resort to reputation management strategies, which are proactive practices used to
maintain good reviews and ratings. These practices can take several forms, from
incentivizing consumers to post positive reviews to generating promotional (or fake)
reviews (Luca and Zervas, 2015; Mayzlin et al., 2014). In the case of promotional
reviews, companies write and post positive reviews for their products or services, and
negative reviews for their competitors. Understanding the e↵ectiveness and e ciency
of these strategies has important implications for companies, consumers, and review
platforms.
The first contribution of this thesis lies in this area of research. In Chapter 2, we
present an empirical analysis of a recent reputation management practice in which
managers publicly respond to consumer reviews. A management response is a com-
pany’s e↵ort to interact with and address customer reviews about their services and
products. Even though this practice is relatively new,6 manager responses to on-
line reviews are becoming an increasingly important and widely adopted reputation
management strategy. Many online platforms, including TripAdvisor, Yelp, Airbnb,
and Google Places allow companies to respond to reviews, and promote their use by
providing useful tips to address positive and negative comments.7 However, despite
6Tripadvisor introduced such practice in 2009, see: http://www.blizzardinternet.com/
news/blizzard-news/tripadvisor-hotel-owners/.
7See https://www.tripadvisor.com/TripAdvisorInsights/n1889/one-thing-your-
8the popularity of management responses, little is known about how this strategy
a↵ects a company’s reputation.
In Chapter 2, we empirically answer this question by focusing on the Texas hotel
industry. Our study presents several findings. First, we show that, on average, hotels
start to respond to reviews after a negative shock to their reputation. However, once
they begin responding, hotels, on average, respond to all the consumer comments
with the same frequency.
Second, we estimate the impact of management response on consumer ratings.
We exploit two panels of hotel reviews from two platforms, TripAdivsor and Expedia,
to show that responding hotels see an average increase of 0.1 stars after they begin
responding to reviews. This finding suggests that management response is an e↵ective
way for companies to improve their online reputation.
Finally, we turn to understand the mechanisms behind the positive e↵ect of
management responses. We show that hotels that respond to reviews receive a larger
number of positive reviews, and fewer but longer negative reviews. We explain these
findings by arguing that the public nature of management responses introduces a new
dynamic among consumers. On the one hand, consumers with a poor experience
are less likely to leave a short indefensible review when they feel that hotels are
scrutinizing them. On the other hand, consumers who had a good experience are
more likely to leave a review when the hotels will acknowledge it. These results
highlight an interesting trade-o↵ for hotel managers who decide to respond to reviews:
fewer negative ratings at the cost of longer and more detailed negative feedback.
management-response-must-do.
91.3 The sharing economy vs. traditional industries
In the last decade, we have witnessed the rise of new marketplaces and business
models. A compelling example of innovative market design is represented by a set of
markets collectively known as the sharing economy. The sharing economy refers to
a set of peer-to-peer markets that allow the sharing of goods and services tradition-
ally provided by long-established industries. Many of these markets are coordinated
through community-based online platforms. While the sharing economy takes several
forms, the underlying idea of such platforms is to use information technology to pro-
vide individuals with information that enables the optimization of resources through
the redistribution, sharing, and reuse of excess capacity in goods and services (Cohen
and Kietzmann, 2014).
While all these platforms share a similar idea, their modes of operation are often
very di↵erent. For example, Airbnb allows thousands of sellers to rent their spare
rooms online, while managing every aspect of the transactions, including prices and
advertising. Finance platforms, such as Indiegogo or Kickstarter, use a variety of pub-
lic good mechanisms to enable individuals to collectively fund project investments.
Labor markets, such as Upwork or TaskRabbit, allow buyers to run small-scale auc-
tions for di↵erent types of tasks. Other businesses, such as Instacart and Uber, prefer
the use of centralized mechanisms to assign workers to jobs, and in doing so, they
can balance the demand and supply by dynamically adjusting prices depending on
the market conditions. For example, Uber makes use of surge prices to reduce the
taxi waiting time in situations of high demand (Hall et al., 2015).
Many of these sharing economy platforms have the size and valuation of decades-
old companies.8 For example, as of January 2016, Uber (founded in 2009) was
available in 68 countries and over 300 cities worldwide.9 By late 2015, Uber was
8See: http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/sharing-economy.
9See: https://www.uber.com/cities.
10
estimated to be worth $62.5 billion, making it the largest venture-backed private
tech company in the world.10 Airbnb, founded in 2008, as of January 2016 listed
on their website more than 2 million properties in 190 countries and 34,000 cities,
making it one of the biggest accommodation companies in the world. The market
valuation of Airbnb is over $25 billion.11
The implications of the rise of the sharing economy have been the center of a
heated debate in the media, and the research community is now joining with deeper
analysis.12 There are several important questions surrounding the sharing economy
that span di↵erent disciplines. Labor economists are trying to understand whether
the sharing economy is simply introducing di↵erent money-making opportunities to
more people, or whether its net e↵ect is the displacement of traditionally secure jobs
with part-time and self-employed workers.13 Policy makers are debating whether the
sharing economy should be regulated (Cohen and Sundararajan, 2015; Edelman and
Geradin, 2015; Katz, 2015; Quattrone et al., 2016). Marketing researchers are trying
to determine whether current reputation mechanism can apply to these markets or
whether we will need more sophisticated techniques (Fradkin et al., 2014; Zervas
et al., 2015a).14 Moreover, marketers are interested in the e↵ects of the incremental
supply created by these markets, and whether the sharing economy has the potential
to impact, or even displace, well-established industries.
This thesis looks at how the sharing economy impacts well-established industries
by focusing on the accommodation sector. In Chapter 3, we empirically investigate
10See: http://www.businessinsider.com/top-10-unicorns-by-valuation-2015-10.
11See: http://www.fastcompany.com/3054873/can-airbnb-unite-the-world.
12See: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-hill/sharing-economy-american-
workers_b_9018724.html or http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2015/12/17/are-
uber-airbnb-and-other-sharing-economy-businesses-good-for-america/#2663e163f696.
13See: https://hbr.org/2015/08/the-gig-economy-is-real-if-you-know-where-to-
look.
14Prosper, for instance, collects and posts credit bureau information about potential borrowers,
and Airbnb verifies the true identity of both buyers and sellers.
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the impact of Airbnb’s entry into the Texas hotel market. Our study provides several
interesting findings. First, we show that Airbnb is negatively a↵ecting hotel room
revenue in Texas. We estimate that in Austin, where Airbnb supply is highest,
the impact on hotel revenue is roughly 8-10% for the most a↵ected hotels. Second,
we show that low-end hotels and hotels that do not cater to business travelers are
the most a↵ected. Finally, we show that most hotels have responded to Airbnb
competition by lowering their prices, an e↵ect that benefits all travelers, not just
participants in the sharing economy. Overall, our work provides empirical evidence
that the sharing economy is successfully competing with traditional companies.
Chapter 2
Online reputation management:
Estimating the impact of management
responses on consumer reviews
2.1 Introduction
User-generated online reviews have been continuously gaining credibility in the eyes
of consumers, and today they are an essential component of the consumer decision-
making process (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006; Luca, 2011). With the popularity
and reach of online review platforms growing rapidly,15 firms are under increasing
pressure to maintain a good online reputation. While investing in improved products
and services can result in better ratings, inevitably firms do experience failures that
lead to negative reviews. Dealing with unfavorable reviews is challenging because,
unlike o✏ine word-of-mouth, they persist online, and can cause indelible damage to
a firm’s reputation. Given that firms can neither selectively delete reviews, nor opt-
out from being reviewed altogether, it is essential for managers to develop reputation
management strategies that can dampen the reputational shock of negative reviews.
Current reputation management practice encompasses various strategies that
vary in their e cacy, and in their adherence to legal and ethical norms. These strate-
gies range from outright review fraud (Mayzlin et al., 2014; Luca and Zervas, 2015),
15For example, TripAdvisor, the world’s largest travel review platform, reached 150 million travel
reviews in 2014, 50 million of which were generated during the last year. See http://www.zacks.
com/stock/news/124495/TripAdvisor-Hits-150M-Travel-Reviews.
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to incentivizing consumers to leave reviews in exchange for perks, to taking legal ac-
tion against consumers who leave negative reviews, and to using non-disparagement
clauses in sales contracts that stipulate fines if consumers write negative reviews.
Meanwhile, technological advancement in detecting fraudulent or incentivized re-
views, enforcement of false advertising regulations against those who commit review
fraud, and emerging legislation aiming to protect consumer free speech online, have
all created an environment where these activities carry significant legal and financial
risk for dubious reward.
In this climate, the practice of publicly responding to consumer reviews has
emerged as an alternative reputation management strategy that is legal, is endorsed
by review platforms, and is widely adopted by managers. A management response
takes the form of an open-ended piece of text that is permanently displayed beneath
the review it addresses. Unlike the review itself, the response does not carry a rat-
ing, and it doesn’t contribute to the calculation of a firm’s average rating. While
review platforms ensure that responses meet certain basic standards (such as avoid-
ing o↵ensive language) they allow any firm to respond to any reviewer. Most major
review platforms, including TripAdvisor and Yelp, allow firms to respond to their
reviews. Yet, despite management responses now being commonplace, their e cacy
in recovering a firm’s reputation remains an open question. Our research aims to fill
this gap.
In this study, we focus on the Texas hospitality industry, and we estimate the
impact of management responses on TripAdvisor hotel ratings. We show that, on
average, responding hotels see a consistent increase of 0.12 stars in their ratings
after they start using management responses. Because TripAdvisor and other review
platforms round average ratings to the nearest half-star, changes even smaller than
0.12 stars can have a material impact. For example, if a 4.24-star hotel can cross the
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4.25-star threshold, it will see its rating jump by half a star, which can in turn cause
a substantial increase in revenue. For restaurants, Luca (2011) finds that a one-star
increase corresponds to 5%-9% increased revenue. In our data, 27% of responding
hotels were able to increase their rounded rating by at least half a star within six
months of their first management response. By comparison, only 16% of the same
hotels were able to increase their rounded rating in the period starting one year
before their first management response and ending six months later.
Having estimated the extent to which management responses improve hotel rat-
ings, we next turn our attention to understanding the mechanism underlying our
findings. We argue that management responses result in better ratings because they
change the cost for a consumer to leave a review. First, we argue that consumer
utility of leaving a positive review increases when hotel managers respond to such
reviews. Second, we argue that management responses increase the cost of leaving a
negative review because reviewers know that their feedback will be scrutinized, and
quite possibly, criticized.
We provide empirical evidence for this mechanism by investigating the impact
of management responses on two additional outcomes managers care about: review
volume and review length. First, we examine the argument that consumers are more
willing to leave a review if managers are likely to notice their feedback. To do this, we
show that review volume increases following the adoption of management responses.
Further, we show that after hotels start responding, they attract more reviewers who
are inherently more positive in their evaluations, suggesting that positive reviewers
see management responses as incentive to leave a review. Next, we examine the
argument that management responses increase the cost of leaving a negative review.
We show that, when hotels respond, even though negative reviews become more in-
frequent, they also become longer. Meanwhile, the length of positive reviews remains
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the same. This suggests that when hotel guests have a poor experience they may opt
out of leaving a review unless they are willing to invest the extra e↵ort required to
write a defensible complaint. While some reviewers will choose to expend this extra
e↵ort, others will not. Thus, when hotels start responding they attract fewer but
longer negative reviews. On the one hand these longer negative reviews may alarm
hotel managers considering responding to all reviews. On the other hand, however,
management responses are in fact a natural side-e↵ect of the mechanism driving the
overall increase in positive ratings. This highlights an interesting trade-o↵ in using
management responses.
Several selection issues need to be considered before ascribing a causal inter-
pretation to our results. First, hotels select into treatment, i.e., by responding to
reviews. Second, hotels choose which reviews to respond to and how to respond
to them. If unaccounted for, these non-random choices can bias estimation of an
average treatment e↵ect (ATE), i.e., the impact of management responses on a ran-
domly chosen hotel. For instance, our estimate could be biased upwards if we do not
account for the possibility that hotels that are “better” at responding are also more
likely to respond. Convincingly controlling for these choices is di cult outside of an
experimental context.
Thus, instead of estimating an ATE, our goal is to consistently estimate an aver-
age treatment e↵ect on the treated (ATT). The ATT can be consistently estimated
when treatment assignment is non-random, and in particular when there is correla-
tion between treatment and potential outcomes, e.g., if hotels decide to respond based
on an expectation that responding will increase their ratings. The ATT answers the
following question: conditional on 1) the hotels that self-selected into treatment, 2)
the reviews they elected to respond to, and 3) the way they responded to them, what
was the impact of these responses on these hotels’ ratings? Though it may seem that
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the ATE is a more informative quantity, the ATT is likely more managerially rele-
vant because, in our setting, treatment is never administered randomly (Heckman
and Robb, 1985; Heckman et al., 1997). Responding to reviews is optional, and it
is unlikely that review platforms will ever make it a requirement. In practice, hotels
may choose to not respond to their TripAdvisor reviews, either if their guests do
not use TripAdvisor, or if they do not have the resources to do so, or if they do not
expect management responses to work well for them.16 One downside of estimating
an ATT is that it may be di↵erent from an ATE. Therefore, the ATT cannot be
interpreted as the impact management can have on the ratings that do not currently
respond. Instead, the ATT measures the impact of management responses did have
on hotels that chose to respond.
When estimating an ATT, endogeneity can still arise if a hotel’s decision to use
management responses is driven by time-varying unobserved factors that also a↵ect
the hotel’s ratings. For instance, a hotel’s decision to respond may be prompted
by (unobserved to us) service improvements and renovations that the hotel made to
avoid further negative reviews. In fact, a recent New York Times article suggests
that hotels commonly use online reviews as a guide for what to renovate.17 Therefore,
increased ratings following a management response can simply reflect an e↵ort by
hotel management to fix the problem that was causing the negative reviews in the
first place, rather than any direct impact of the management responses themselves.
To eliminate this source of bias, we need to control for unobserved changes in hotel
quality. We approach this identification challenge in two ways, which require di↵erent
assumptions from the data, and which exploit di↵erent sources of variation.
16Consider the analogy of evaluating an optional training program. It may be the case that
higher-ability students choose to enroll in the program. In terms of evaluating the program, what
we want to know is the program’s impact on these higher-ability students. Unless we can force
lower-ability students to enroll, estimating the program’s impact on them is inconsequential.
17See http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/23/business/hotels-use-online-reviews-as-
blueprint-for-renovations.html.
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Our first identification strategy uses Expedia ratings to control for changes in
hotel quality. This approach is motivated by a di↵erence in managerial practice
between TripAdvisor and Expedia: while hotels frequently respond to TripAdvisor
reviews, they almost never do so on Expedia.18 Therefore, assuming TripAdvisor
and Expedia are used in an either-or way, a TripAdvisor user is much more likely
to read a management response and hence be a↵ected by it than an Expedia user.
We build upon this observation to estimate the ATT using a di↵erence-in-di↵erences
(DD) identification strategy. Intuitively, the DD estimator compares changes in the
TripAdvisor ratings of any given hotel following its decision to begin responding
against a baseline of changes in the same hotel’s Expedia ratings over the same
period of time. The key assumption needed for the DD estimate to be consistent is
that di↵erences between TripAdvisor and Expedia ratings would have been constant
in the absence of treatment (often referred to as the parallel trends assumption.) To
defend this assumption, we need to understand why hotels respond on one platform
but not the other.
Is the choice to only respond on TripAdvisor exogenously determined, or is it
itself driven by changes in hotel quality? An explanation for this hotel behavior that
is compatible with our identification assumption is that reviews are less salient on
Expedia. Unlike TripAdvisor, which is in the business of collecting and disseminating
reviews, Expedia is an online travel agency (Mayzlin et al. (2014) make the same
point.) Comparing the information available for any given hotel on the two sites
highlights this distinction: while TripAdvisor prominently displays a hotel’s reviews,
Expedia displays a booking form, prices for various room types, and the hotel’s
average rating – individual reviews and responses are only available on a secondary
page accessible by following a link on the hotel’s main Expedia page. Further, reviews
on Expedia are typically much shorter, and may not merit a response. Finally, we
18In our data, 31.5% of TripAdvisor reviews carry a response, compared to 2.2% on Expedia.
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note that both platforms order reviews by date, and therefore, recent reviews and
management responses associated with them are more likely to be read. Reviews
on Expedia arrive at almost twice the rate they do on TripAdvisor. Therefore,
Expedia reviews are superseded by fresher information, faster. This suggests that
each Expedia response will be seen by fewer people, and, thus, hotels may be less
inclined to respond on Expedia.
If the decision to begin responding is not driven by hotel improvements, then
why do hotels start responding? In Section 2.4, we show that hotels adopt manage-
ment responses after a transient negative shock to their TripAdvisor ratings. This
observation also provides further evidence against the theory that renovations and
management responses coincide in time: if hotels renovated when they started re-
sponding, their ratings would be more likely to go up than down. At the same time,
selection into management responses during a transient shock on ratings raises a sep-
arate concern: if selection into management responses coincides with hotels receiving
unusually low ratings, then their ratings in the period after they start responding
are likely to be higher regardless of any action on the hotels part (Ashenfelter and
Card, 1985). Therefore, selection on transient rating shocks can bias our estimates.
However, this type of bias is easy to correct for by di↵erencing post-treatment ratings
against ratings from a period prior to the selection period. Overall, these observa-
tions support the use of Expedia ratings as a control for hotel quality.
When will cross-platform DD be biased? If Expedia and TripAdvisor users dif-
ferentially valuations the same hotel improvements, then endogeneity becomes a
concern. For instance, our ATT estimate could be biased if hotels make renovations
specifically targeted at and valued by TripAdvisor users, which they then announce
by responding to TripAdvisor reviews. In this case, it would be the renovations caus-
ing TripAdvisor ratings to increase relative to Expedia, rather than the management
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responses. Therefore, for Expedia ratings to be a credible control group we need
to assume that TripAdvisor and Expedia users do not have di↵erential values for
the same hotel improvements. Mayzlin et al. (2014) rely on a similar assumption to
measure review fraud incentives using TripAdvisor and Expedia data.
Here, we exploit the rich nature of our data to provide empirical evidence in
support of this assumption. First, we show that for a long period preceding each ho-
tel’s first management response, TripAdvisor and Expedia ratings moved in parallel.
Therefore, at least prior to treatment, ratings on the two review platforms are con-
sistent with TripAdvisor and Expedia users valuing changes in hotel quality equally.
Second, we show that management responses on TripAdvisor had no impact on the
same hotel’s Expedia ratings. Therefore, for our estimate to be biased it would have
to be the case that Expedia users have, on average, no value whatsoever for hotel
improvements targeted at TripAdvisor users. Third, to mitigate the concern that
the average TripAdvisor and Expedia users are di↵erent enough to value the same
hotel improvements di↵erently, we perform our analysis on subsets of users who are
similar. Specifically, we show that our results hold when we analyze our data by trav-
eler segment (e.g., business travelers, or families). While the average TripAdvisor
and Expedia reviewers may value the same hotel improvements di↵erently, we have
less reason to believe that a TripAdvisor business traveler values hotel improvements
di↵erently than an Expedia business traveler. Fourth, we show that the magnitude
of the ATT is larger for hotels that respond more frequently. Thus, for endogeneity
to arise, the frequency with which hotels respond would have to be positively cor-
related with the di↵erence in value TripAdvisor and Expedia users have the hotel’s
renovations. Fifth, we show that the impact of management responses is larger when
reviewers are more likely to have read them. Whether any specific reviewer reads
a management response is outside a hotel’s control. Therefore, it is unlikely that
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TripAdvisor users who happen to read a management response have higher value for
the hotel’s improvements than Expedia users, while TripAdvisor users who do not
happen to read a response value the hotel’s improvements similarly to Expedia users.
These robustness checks favor the assumptions required to use Expedia ratings
to control for hotel quality. However, since we rely on observational data, it is
fundamentally impossible to prove that the assumptions hold, i.e., to entirely rule
out the possibility of endogeneity arising from di↵erences between TripAdvisor and
Expedia. Therefore, to avoid bias due to cross-platform di↵erences, we develop a
second identification strategy that avoids using Expedia ratings altogether. The
idea behind this strategy is to keep hotel quality fixed rather than to control for it.
Specifically, we rely on the intuition that any di↵erence in the ratings of two guests
who stayed at the same hotel at the same time, is unlikely to be due to unobserved
hotel improvements. We can implement this strategy because TripAdvisor users
report their travel dates. Thus, to estimate the impact of management responses,
we compare the ratings of guests who left a review before a hotel began responding
with the ratings of guests who stayed at the same hotel at the same time but left a
review after the hotel began responding. Our estimate for the impact of management
responses using this identification strategy is nearly identical to our estimate using
cross-platform identification, even though the two strategies rely on di↵erent data
and di↵erent assumptions. The main concern with this identification strategy is
that the time elapsed between traveling and reviewing is correlated with a guest’s
ratings. For instance, bias may arise if reviewers with a negative experience tend to
leave reviews faster than reviewers with a positive experience. Fortunately, because
we know both when a guest traveled and when the guest left a review, we can control
for the time elapsed between the two events.
A separate identification issue arises from the fact that management responses
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are one of the various strategies hotels can use to manage their reputation. If hotels
simultaneously adopt more than one reputation management strategy, we may be
unable to disentangle their individual e↵ects. In our setting, review fraud stands out
as the most prominent reputation management strategy hotels may adopt together
with management responses (Mayzlin et al., 2014; Luca and Zervas, 2015). To en-
sure that the ATT we estimate is not driven by review fraud, we conduct further
robustness checks to show that our results hold for hotels that are unlikely to commit
review fraud in the first place.
We organize the remainder of this study as follows. In Section 2.2 we outline the
empirical framework we use to identify the causal impact of management responses
on hotel ratings. Next, in Section 2.3 we describe the dataset we use, and provide
descriptive statistics. In Section 2.4 we present our results, and in Section 2.5 we
provide theoretical support for our findings.
2.2 Empirical strategy
Our goal in this study is to estimate the impact of management responses on the
ratings of hotels that respond to reviews. This quantity is an average treatment
e↵ect on the treated (ATT), and it is only defined for hotels that have elected to re-
spond to TripAdvisor reviewers. Therefore, it is not necessarily equal to the average
treatment e↵ect (ATE), which is the e↵ect management responses would have had
on the TripAdvisor ratings of a randomly chosen hotel. To motivate our empirical
strategy, we consider an exogenous intervention that would allow us to estimate the
ATT. With access to the TripAdvisor platform, we would randomly assign TripAd-
visor visitors into one of two conditions: a treatment group exposed to a version of
the site that displays management responses (i.e., the current TripAdvisor site), and
a control group exposed to a version modified to omit management responses, but
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identical otherwise. Then, using counterfactual notation, for any responding hotel i
the ATT is
E(Yi1   Yi0|D = 1)
where Yi1 is a TripAdvisor rating for hotel i from the treatment condition, Yi0 is a
TripAdvisor rating from the control condition, and D = 1 indicates that hotel i is
among those that are treated, i.e., among those that post management responses.
In estimating an ATT, the key challenge presented by our lack of experimental
data is that we do not observe the counterfactual ratings Yi0 that consumers would
have submitted had they not been exposed to management responses; this is a quan-
tity that we need to identify E(Yi0|D = 1). To address this identification challenge
we need to construct an appropriate control group out of our non-experimental data
to stand in for Yi0.
Before describing our identification strategy for the ATT, we highlight some di -
culties inherent in estimating an ATE even with a randomized controlled trial. Unlike
the hypothetical ATT experiment that randomly exposes some users to management
responses, to estimate the ATE we would have to ask a random set of hotels to start
responding. But then, we would also have to instruct these hotels on which reviews
to respond to. While this could also be done at random, it is hard to argue that
this strategy is close to what hotels might do in practice. Supposing that we are OK
with hotels responding to random reviews, we have further to randomize the types
of responses they post. Should they respond in an antagonistic or in a conciliatory
manner? In depth, or briefly? The space of treatments (i.e., response strategies)
seems so vast that, unless we want to estimate the ATE of a specific strategy, focus-
ing on the impact of management responses given the way hotels currently respond
(i.e., the ATT) seems more sensible.
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2.2.1 Cross-platform identification strategy
A first solution, which exploits the panel nature of our data, is to use the ratings of
hotel i submitted prior to its first management response as a control group. Using
the superscripts pre and post for ratings submitted before and after hotel i be-
gan responding, the required assumption to identify the ATT is E(Y prei0 |D = 1) =
E(Y posti0 |D = 1).19 This assumption is unlikely to hold, leading to endogeneity in our
estimation. The key threat to validity is that hotels often use management responses
to advertise improvements they have made following a poor review, and therefore
increased ratings following a management response can be the result of these improve-
ments, rather than the outcome of consumer exposure to the management response
itself.
A second solution to the identification challenge is based on the observation that
most hotels that respond to their TripAdvisor reviews do not respond to their re-
views on Expedia. Therefore, in principle, we could use the Expedia ratings of hotel
i in place of the unobserved counterfactual ratings Yi0. Denoting Expedia ratings by
Z, the necessary identification condition is E(Yi0|D = 1) = E(Zi0|D = 1), and it is
also unlikely to hold. In this case, the endogeneity issue arising is that TripAdvisor
and Expedia reviewers are likely to di↵er in unobservable ways that determine their
ratings. For example, in Table 2.2, we show that the average hotel rating on TripAd-
visor is 0.3 stars lower than on Expedia, i.e., Expedia reviewers report greater levels
of satisfaction.
In this study, we combine the above two approaches in a di↵erence-in-di↵erences
(DD) identification strategy, which requires weaker assumptions. We proceed in two
steps: first, we construct a matched-control for each hotel’s TripAdvisor ratings using
19For ease of presentation, we describe our identification strategy in terms of two periods, before
and after treatment, but its extension to a setting with multiple pre and post periods is straight-
forward.
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the same hotel’s ratings on Expedia; then, we compare post-treatment di↵erences
in the hotel’s TripAdvisor ratings against a baseline of post-treatment di↵erences in
same hotel’s Expedia ratings. Formally stated, our main identification assumption
is
E(Y posti0   Y prei0 |D = 1, X) = E(Zposti0   Zprei0 |D = 0, X). (2.1)
This is the so-called parallel-trends assumption of DD models, and it is weaker
than both assumptions stated above. It states that, conditional on observed charac-
teristics X, di↵erences in (potential) outcomes do not depend on whether a unit was
treated, or not. Crucially, it allows both for platform-independent transient shocks
to hotel ratings arising from quality investments that coincide with management
responses, as well as time-invariant cross-platform di↵erences in hotel ratings. An-
other important advantage of this identification strategy is that we can partially test
its underlying assumptions by comparing the pre-treatment rating trends of treated
and control units. We return to this point in Section 2.4.1, where we show that
pre-treatment trends are indeed parallel, thereby providing evidence in support of
our main identification assumption. This is our preferred identification strategy, and
we will refer to it as cross-platform DD to highlight its use of hotel ratings from both
TripAdvisor and Expedia.
Matching and DD have been successfully combined to identify causal e↵ects in
a number of studies (e.g., Singh and Agrawal (2011), Azoulay et al. (2013), and
Kova´cs and Sharkey (2014).) The matching step is taken to ensure the compatibility
of treated and control units in terms of their potential outcomes, which is the main
DD identification assumption. An important distinction of our matching sample with
respect to papers that use a similar empirical strategy is that the treated and control
units in our study are not just similar with respect to some observable properties,
but they are in fact exactly the same hotel unit. This exact one-to-one matching
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Figure 2·1: Within-platform identification relies on the reviews of
hotel A but not hotel B.
procedure almost entirely eliminates the key concern of the comparability among
treated and control hotels. This is important because as recognized in Imbens (2004),
stringent matching criteria reduce concerns about endogeneity-related biases.
Triple di↵erences. As a robustness check, we also estimate the e↵ect of manage-
ment responses using a di↵erence-in-di↵erence-in-di↵erences (DDD) design, which
allows us to simultaneously control for cross-platform and cross-hotel confounders.
To implement DDD, we first need to identify a control group of hotels that should
have been una↵ected by treatment on either review platform. We again rely on the
natural hotel matching available to us, and use all non-responding TripAdvisor ho-
tels, and their corresponding 1-1 matched Expedia units. Conceptually, DDD takes
place in two DD steps. First, we compute a cross-platform DD for responding ho-
tels, similar to Equation 2.1. Then, we adjust this DD for unobserved cross-platform
di↵erences by subtracting from it the cross-platform DD for non-responding hotels.
Formally stated, the DDD identification assumption is:
E ((Y t+1i0   Y ti0)  (Zt+1i0   Zti0)|D = 1, X) (2.2)
= E((Y t+1i0   Y ti0)  (Zt+1i0   Zti0)|D = 0, X).
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2.2.2 Within-platform identification strategy
Our cross-platform DD identification strategy is robust to review-platform inde-
pendent, transitory shocks to hotel ratings. However, unobserved platform-specific
shocks to hotel ratings whose timing is correlated with management responses can
bias our estimation. In this section, we describe an identification strategy to mitigate
this concern. Our approach exploits the fact that most (over 98%) TripAdvisor re-
viewers indicate in their reviews when they stayed in a hotel. The insight motivating
this identification strategy is that any di↵erence in the ratings of two TripAdvisor
reviewers who stayed at the same hotel at the same time is unlikely to be driven by
unobserved hotel renovations. This model only relies on variation in the ratings of
guests who stayed at the same hotel in the same month to identify the impact of
management responses.
Figure 2·1 illustrates how this identification strategy solves the problem of un-
observed hotel renovations. Within-platform identification of the impact of manage-
ment responses conditional on guests’ dates of stay relies on the di↵erence between
reviews A1 and A2 but not B1 and B2. Hotel A’s unobserved renovation is not a
concern because guests A1 and A2 stayed at the hotel at the same time. By contrast,
a comparison of reviews B1 and B2 could result in bias when estimating the impact
of management responses because guest B2 experienced hotel renovations that guest
B1 didn’t. However, the within-platform identification strategy does not take into
account the di↵erence between reviews B1 and B2 to estimate the ATT.
2.3 Data
To study the e↵ect of management review responses on hotel reputation we combine
information collected from various sources. In this section, we describe the various
datasets we collected, and then we explain how we merged them to obtain the sample
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we use in our analyses.
The two major sources of data we use are TripAdvisor and Expedia reviews for
Texas hotels. TripAdvisor is a major travel review platform that contains more than
150 million reviews for millions of accommodations, restaurants, and attractions.
TripAdvisor reached over 260 million consumers per month during 2013,20 a fact
that signifies its influence on traveler decision making. We collected the entire review
history of the 5, 356 Texas hotels and accommodations that are listed on TripAdvisor.
In total, our TripAdvisor sample contains 314, 776 reviews, with the oldest review
being from August 2001, and the most recent from December 2013. Each review in
our dataset is associated with a star rating, text content, the date it was submitted,
and a unique identifier for the reviewer who submitted it. If the review received a
management response, we record the date the response was posted, which typically
di↵ers from the date the review was submitted, and the content of the response. Out
of the 5, 356 hotels in our TripAdvisor sample, 4, 603 received at least one review,
and 2, 590 left at least one management response.
Expedia is an online travel agent that provides services like airline and hotel reser-
vations, and car rentals. Similar to TripAdvisor, consumers can review the Expedia
services they purchase. We collected the entire review history of the 3, 845 Texas
hotels listed on Expedia, for a total of 519, 962 reviews. The earliest Expedia review
is from September 2004, and the most recent is from December 2013. Our Expedia
review sample contains the same review attributes as our TripAdvisor sample. Out
of the 3, 845 hotels in our Expedia sample, 3, 356 were reviewed, and 587 left at least
one management response.
Having collected TripAdvisor and Expedia reviews, our next step is to link these
review samples together by hotel. To do so we exploit a feature of the Expedia web-
20See: http://techcrunch.com/2013/11/21/tripadvisor-scores-deep-bing-
integration-with-its-hotel-metasearch-launches-windows-8-1-app/
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site: Expedia provides a link to each hotel’s TripAdvisor page, if such a page exists
on TripAdvisor. This allows us to accurately match nearly every hotel’s Expedia
and TripAdvisor reviews. To verify the accuracy of the Expedia provided link we
randomly sampled 100 Expedia-TripAdvisor pairs, and manually verified that they
correspond to the same hotel, by checking the hotel’s name and address. We found
no discrepancies. Using this information, we are able to match 3, 681 out of 3, 845
Expedia hotels (96% of the Expedia hotel sample). Of the 3, 681 matched hotels,
3, 264 are reviewed on both sites. After matching each hotel across the two review
platforms, we further balance our estimation sample by limiting ourselves to hotels
that have been reviewed on both sites. This way, our data includes TripAdvisor
and Expedia ratings for every hotel, and thus allows us to identify our treatment
e↵ect from only within-hotel, cross-platform variation. After limiting our sample to
hotels that have been reviewed on both review platforms, we are left with a total of
806, 342 reviews, out of which 291, 119 are from TripAdvisor, and 515, 223 are from
Expedia. Finally, since in some of our analyses we use Expedia ratings as a control
group, we also create a subset of data that excludes any hotels that have posted
management responses on Expedia. This leaves us with 2, 697 matched hotels, and
552, 051 reviews, of which 203, 068 are from TripAdvisor, and 348, 983 are from Ex-
pedia. Table 2.1 describes the various estimation samples we use in our analyses.
The matched set of TripAdvisor and Expedia ratings for hotels that have been re-
viewed on both platforms, excluding hotels that have ever responded on Expedia,
constitutes our main estimation sample.21
21We have conducted separate analyses with estimation samples that include the ratings of hotels
that respond on Expedia up to the point they begin responding, as well as the ratings of hotels
that have only been reviewed on one of the two review platforms. Our results are not sensitive to
these alternative choices of estimation sample.
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Table 2.1: Dataset description.
TripAdvisor Expedia
All hotels 5,356 3,845
Reviewed 4,603 3,356
Responding 2,590 587
Reviews 314,776 519,962
Responses 99,178 11,781
Matched hotels 3,681 3,681
Reviewed 3,511 3,265
Responding 2,387 568
Reviews 296,138 515,227
Responses 97,684 11,779
Matched hotels reviewed on both platforms 3,264 3,264
Responding 2,303 567
Reviews 291,119 515,223
Responses 96,665 11,776
Cross-platform DD hotels* 1,762 1,762
Reviews 166,152 263,804
Responses 55,684  
Cross-platform DDD hotels** 2,697 2,697
Reviews 203,068 348,983
Responses 55,684  
* Matched responding hotels that are reviewed on both platforms, excluding hotels
that respond on Expedia.
** Matched hotels that are reviewed on both platforms, excluding hotels that
respond on Expedia.
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Collecting user review histories. In Section 2.5, we use the entire TripAdvisor
review history of every user who reviewed a Texas hotel on TripAdvisor. For every
user that reviewed a hotel in our TripAdvisor sample, we collected his or her entire
review history for a total of 3, 047, 428 reviews from 214, 141 users. We were not able
to obtain the review histories of a small fraction of users (2.2%) either because they
left anonymous reviews on TripAdvisor (the username associated with such reviews
is “A TripAdvisor Member”), or because they have closed their TripAdvisor account,
and therefore their user profiles do not exist anymore.
2.3.1 Descriptive statistics
A key di↵erence between TripAdvisor and Expedia, which we exploit in our analysis,
is that hotels often post management responses on TripAdvisor, but they rarely do so
on Expedia. Figure 2·2 illustrates this di↵erence: we plot the cumulative percentage
of reviews that have received a management response by year. We find that by
2013, 31.5% of TripAdvisor reviews had received a management response compared
to only 2.3% for Expedia, highlighting the di↵erence in the rate of management
response adoption across the two review platforms.
Having established that management responses are infrequent on Expedia, we
next turn our attention to investigating the adoption patterns of management re-
sponses on TripAdvisor. An interesting aspect underlying the increasing adoption
trend of management responses on TripAdvisor is the elapsed time between a review
being posted and receiving a management response. Figure 2·3 plots the average lag
(measured in days) between reviews and management responses by review submis-
sion year. On average, TripAdvisor reviews submitted in 2013 received a response 25
days later, while reviews posted in 2009 received a response almost 10 months later.
How can we explain the managerial practice of responding to old reviews? A possible
interpretation is that hotel managers are concerned that even old reviews can be read
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by, and can a↵ect, the decision-making process of future TripAdvisor visitors. By
responding to these old reviews, hotel managers are potentially attempting to steer
the behavior of future TripAdvisor visitors who might stumble upon them.
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Figure 2·2: The cumulative number of responses over the cumulative
number of reviews posted by year.
Next we turn our attention to analyzing the frequency with which hotels respond
to reviews on TripAdvisor. Figure 2·4 plots the fraction of TripAdvisor reviews that
received a response, by star-rating. While a priori we might expect negative reviews
to be more likely to receive a response, we find that, in our data, this is not the case.
In fact, 5-star reviews are as likely to receive a response as negative reviews.
What are the characteristics of hotels that use management responses? Table 2.2
compares hotels by their adoption of management responses on TripAdvisor. We
find that responding hotels have higher average ratings both on TripAdvisor and
on Expedia. The mean di↵erence between the star-ratings of responding and non-
responding hotels is 0.5-stars. Table 2.2 also highlights an interesting cross-platform
di↵erence: while on average Texas hotels have more reviews on Expedia than they do
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Figure 2·3: Average lag (in days) between a TripAdvisor review and
its management response by review submission year. We omit years
prior to 2009 because of insu cient observations.
on TripAdvisor, the length of the text associated with the average Expedia review is
only one-third of the length of the average TripAdvisor review. The average Expedia
review is 201 characters long, only slightly longer than a tweet. This di↵erence may
further explain the reason behind the lower rate of adoption of management responses
on Expedia: consumers do not write long, descriptive Expedia reviews that merit a
response.
2.4 Results
In this section, we present the results of regression analyses we carried out to estimate
the causal e↵ect of management responses on hotel reputation. These analyses are
based on the three identification strategies we described above. In addition to these
findings, we provide empirical evidence in support of the identification assumptions
underlying our causal claims.
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Figure 2·4: The fraction of TripAdvisor reviews that received a man-
agement response by star-rating. The dashed line is the overall average,
which is 31.5%.
2.4.1 Cross-platform DD
Cross-platform DD, which is our preferred specification, estimates changes to the
TripAdvisor ratings of any given hotel after it starts responding, relative to before,
and adjusted for any change over the same period to its Expedia ratings. The
identifying assumption that allows a causal interpretation of our findings is that
TripAdvisor and Expedia ratings would have evolved in parallel in the absence of
treatment. While this assumption is not fully testable, the panel nature of our data
generates some testable hypotheses that we can use to reinforce the plausibility of
our causal claims. Specifically, given our long observation period, we can test for
di↵erences in trends between the two platforms prior to treatment.
To compare pre-treatment trends, we partition time around the day each hotel
started responding in 30-day intervals, taking the o↵set of the first response to be 0.
Then, for example, [0, 30) is the 30-day interval starting on the day the hotel began
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Table 2.2: Hotel summary statistics. A matched hotel is one which
exists on both TripAdvisor and Expedia.
TripAdvisor Expedia
Matched Hotels
Avg. hotel rating 3.6 3.9
Reviews per hotel 84.3 157.8
Responses per hotel 27.8 3.6
Avg. review length 617.0 201.0
Avg. response length 439.2 306.5
Matched hotels that respond on TripAdvisor
Avg. hotel rating 3.8 4.1
Reviews per hotel 107.4 183.7
Responses per hotel 40.9 5.0
Avg. review length 624.3 200.2
Avg. response length 439.2 307.2
Matched hotels that don’t respond on TripAdvisor
Avg. hotel rating 3.3 3.6
Reviews per hotel 35.4 95.7
Responses per hotel   0.2
Avg. review length 601.3 203.0
Avg. response length   291.6
responding, and [ 30, 0) is the 30-day interval just before. We focus our trend
analysis on the two-year period centered on each hotel’s first response, resulting
in the definition of 24 distinct intervals. Since hotels began responding at di↵erent
times, these intervals correspond to di↵erent calendar dates for di↵erent hotels. Next,
we associate each TripAdvisor and Expedia rating in our estimation sample with a
dummy variable indicating the interval that contains it. Finally, we estimate the
following DD regression
Starsijt =  1Afterijt +  2TripAdvisorj (2.3)
+ Intervalijt ⇥ TripAdvisorij + ↵j + ⌧t + ✏ijt,
where Starsijt is the star-rating of review i for hotel j in calendar month t, Afterijt
is an indicator for reviews (on either platform) submitted after hotel j started re-
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sponding, TripAdvisorij is an indicator for TripAdvisor ratings, and Intervalijt is the
set of 30-day long treatment clock dummies we described above. The coe cient for
Afterijt captures di↵erences in ratings between treatment and non-treatment peri-
ods, the coe cient for TripAdvisorij captures di↵erences in ratings across platforms,
and  , the vector of interaction coe cients associated with each interval, is the
di↵erence-in-di↵erences estimate of interest. Finally, our model includes calendar-
month fixed-e↵ects ⌧t to control for transient shocks in ratings that are common
across review platforms.
While we could estimate this model by pooling ratings from di↵erent hotels to-
gether, we choose to include a matched-pair fixed e↵ect ↵j, i.e., a shared fixed e↵ect
for reviews of the same hotel from either review platform. The use of matched-pair
fixed e↵ects enables identification from only within-hotel variation.22 In this statisti-
cal modeling choice, we follow the recent studies of Azoulay et al. (2013), Singh and
Agrawal (2011), and Kova´cs and Sharkey (2014), who use the same technique when
estimating matched DD models.
We estimate the model in Equation 2.3 using OLS. To account for serial corre-
lation in our dependent variable, we cluster errors at the hotel level (Donald and
Lang, 2007; Bertrand et al., 2004). We choose to normalize the coe cient for the
[ 60, 30) interval to 0. While choosing a di↵erent baseline would have yielded
identical conclusions, our particular choice eases presentation as will become evident
shortly. The coe cients of the remaining intervals can be interpreted as di↵erences
between TripAdvisor and Expedia ratings over time with respect to the [ 60, 30)
baseline. We present a graphical analysis of our estimates in Figure 2·5. The fig-
ure plots the estimated values of the interval coe cients  , together with their 95%
confidence intervals.
The figure reveals several distinctive features of hotel rating dynamics prior to,
22The results of a pooled regression are not meaningfully di↵erent.
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Figure 2·5: The evolution of treatment e↵ects, i.e., di↵erences in
hotel ratings between Expedia and TripAdvisor, as a function of a
hotel’s decision to begin responding to reviews. The solid line plots
the  -coe cient estimates from Equation 2.3, and the dashed lines
their respective 95% confidence intervals.
and following the adoption of management responses. First, visual inspection of
pre-treatment trends suggests that they are parallel with the exception of the 30-day
interval immediately preceding the treatment period. To back this claim statistically,
we perform a Wald test, which fails to reject (p < 0.43) the hypothesis of joint
equality among pre-treatment intervals excluding [ 30, 0). Second, the figure reveals
an outlier at [ 30, 0), which indicates that hotels adopt management responses as a
reputation management strategy when they experience a substantive negative shock
to their TripAdvisor ratings. This negative shock to TripAdvisor ratings prior to
adopting management responses is reminiscent of Ashenfelter’s dip (Ashenfelter and
Card, 1985), an empirical regularity first observed in the context of job training
programs, where program participants tended to experience an earnings drop just
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prior to enrolling in them. The presence of Ashenfelter’s dip can overstate our DD
estimates because hotel ratings – just like employee earnings – are likely to mean
revert following an out of the ordinary negative period regardless of any intervention
by hotel management. Following common practice (see, e.g., Heckman and Smith
(1999); Jepsen et al. (2014); Li et al. (2011)), we correct for Ashenfelter’s dip by
computing long-run di↵erences, which symmetrically exclude a number of periods
around the adoption of management responses. Our final observation regards the
post-treatment period, and it foreshadows our main result. Following the adoption
of management responses, we see a sustained increase in ratings. In fact, hotel
ratings not only recover following the adoption of management responses, but they
consistently exceed their prior levels by over 0.1 stars.
Given the graphical evidence in support of the parallel trends assumption under-
lying our identification strategy, we next estimate the causal impact of management
responses on hotel ratings. The following model implements our cross-platform DD
identification strategy:
Starsijt =  1Afterijt +  2TripAdvisorij (2.4)
+ Afterijt ⇥ TripAdvisorij +Xijt + ↵j + ⌧t + ✏ijt,
The variables in this model are as in Equation 2.3, with the addition of controls
Xijt. As is common in DD analyses, we include review-platform specific quadratic
time-trends in Xijt as an additional safeguard against non-parallel trends. Again,
the matched-hotel fixed e↵ects ↵j ensure that our identification relies only on within-
hotel variation, i.e., comparing the ratings of any given hotel on TripAdvisor with
the ratings of the same hotel on Expedia. The primary coe cient of interest is  ,
which measures the causal impact of management responses on hotel ratings.
We first estimate Equation 2.4 on the sample of responding hotels using OLS
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with standard errors clustered at the hotel level. We present our results in the
first column of Table 2.3. The estimated coe cient for the interaction term
Afterijt⇥TripAdvisorij is 0.15 stars, and it is highly statistically significant. Next, to
correct for Ashenfelter’s dip, we repeat our estimation excluding ratings submitted
anywhere between 30 days prior, and 30 days following a hotel’s first management
response.23 We present these results in the second column of Table 2.3. As expected,
our adjusted estimate for   is slightly smaller. However, even after accounting for
transient negative shocks to hotel ratings prior to the response period, we find that
management responses cause subsequent hotel ratings to rise by an average of 0.12
stars.
The coe cient for Afterijt, which measures changes in the ratings of Expedia re-
viewers over the same time period, is also of interest, as it can be seen as the treatment
e↵ect on the non-treated. We estimate its value to be statistically indistinguishable
from zero, suggesting that Expedia reviewers were una↵ected by management re-
sponses on TripAdvisor. This is as we would have hoped for, and provides additional
evidence in support of the parallel trends identification assumption. If ratings for the
control group had changed following treatment, it would be harder to argue that con-
trolling for these changes completely eliminates bias. Moreover, because Expedia’s
reviewers were una↵ected by the treatment, it is highly unlikely that TripAdvisor
increased ratings (after the adoption of management responses) were the outcome
of unobserved hotel improvement to avoid further negative reviews – unless one is
willing to argue that only TripAdvisor’s reviewers experienced these improvements,
and Expedia’s users did not see any change whatsoever. We perform additional
robustness checks against this type of concern in section 2.4.2.
Overall our analysis suggests that responding hotels were able to significantly
increase their future TripAdvisor ratings solely by responding to their past reviews.
23Sensitivity tests excluding longer periods did not yield meaningfully di↵erent results.
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Table 2.3: Cross-platform DD.
(1) (2) (3)
After ⇥ TripAdvisor 0.149*** 0.123*** 0.097***
(7.21) (5.49) (5.18)
TripAdvisor  1.006***  1.027***  0.803***
( 20.38) ( 20.21) ( 18.33)
After  0.005  0.012  0.003
( 0.45) ( 0.91) ( 0.24)
Avg. Rating 0.288***
(26.54)
Log Review Count  0.003
( 0.67)
Ashenfelter’s dip correction No Yes Yes
N 429956 415361 411993
R2 within 0.020 0.020 0.024
Note: The dependent variable is rating i of hotel j at time t. Cluster-robust t-statistics (at
the individual hotel level) are shown in parentheses. All specifications include time fixed
e↵ects and platform-specific linear time trends.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
2.4.2 Robustness checks for cross-platform DD
Di↵erences in cross-platform traveler demographics and TripAdvisor-
specific improvements. A key implication of the assumption underlying cross-
platform DD identification is that TripAdvisor and Expedia users do not di↵eren-
tially value certain hotel improvements that happen to coincide with the adoption
of management responses. Mayzlin et al. (2014) rely on a similar assumption for
identification (specifically “that TripAdvisor and Expedia users do not di↵erentially
value hotel ownership and a liation characteristics and the ownership and a liation
characteristics of neighbors.”). If this assumption fails, cross-platform DD will lead
to upwards biased estimates. To exemplify this concern, suppose that the dominant
demographic on TripAdvisor is business travelers, while there are few or no Expedia
users who belong to this travel segment. Then, a hotel manager monitoring Trip-
Advisor reviews might simultaneously react in two ways. First, the manager might
ensure that the concerns raised in the reviews of business travelers are addressed,e.g.,
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by making improvements to the hotel’s business center. Second, the manager may
respond to the TripAdvisor reviews that raised these concerns. Under these cir-
cumstances, the manager’s action could result in a TripAdvisor-specific increase in
ratings, thereby inducing bias in our estimation.
How likely is this type of bias in our setting? Recall that previously we found
that Expedia ratings do not change at all following the adoption of management
responses on TripAdvisor (the coe cient for Afterijt is statistically indistinguishable
from zero.) Therefore, if the e↵ect we measure is due to unobserved hotel improve-
ments, then Expedia users do not value these improvements at all. Even though it
is plausible that Expedia users have di↵erent tastes than TripAdvisor users, and, in-
deed, that they value TripAdvisor-specific improvements less than TripAdvisor users,
it is less likely that Expedia users’ tastes are so widely di↵erent that they do not
value TripAdvisor-specific improvements at all. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out
that Expedia users have zero value for TripAdvisor-specific improvements and hotels
target their improvements at traveler segments that are overrepresented by a wide
margin on TripAdvisor and that these TripAdvisor-specific improvements coincide
with the adoption of management responses. In this section, we perform additional
robustness checks to guard against this type of concern.
Our robustness checks rely on the fact that both TripAdvisor and Expedia ask
reviewers about the purpose of their trip at review submission time. This informa-
tion is voluntarily provided by reviewers, and therefore not all reviews carry such
a designation. Moreover, in our sample, Expedia appears to have started collecting
this information in 2010, whereas TripAdvisor started collecting this information as
early as 2003. Nevertheless, the number of reviews carrying this label is substan-
tial: considering post-2009 reviews, 48% of Expedia reviews and 89% of TripAdvisor
reviews are associated with a particular traveler segment. The four most popu-
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lar traveler segments, on both platforms, are “business”, “couples”, “families”, and
“friends”. Expedia allows users to select among other less popular choices (such as
“golfing trip” and “students”) that do not exist as options on TripAdvisor. We focus
our analysis on the four segments that exist on both platforms, and which comprise
the majority of labeled reviews. We then repeat our cross-platform DD estimation,
including a correction for Ashenfelter’s dip, by traveler segment. The idea motivat-
ing this robustness check is that by separately analyzing each traveler segment, we
lower the probability of bias arising from cross-platform reviewer heterogeneity. We
present these results in Table 2.4. We find that our results are robust to condition-
ing on traveler segment. Management responses have a positive (and interestingly
similar in magnitude) impact on the ratings of di↵erent traveler types. Taken to-
gether, these by-segment regressions suggest that our results are unlikely to be due
to TripAdvisor-specific improvements made by hotels at the same time they start
responding.
Table 2.4: Cross-platform DD by traveler segment.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Business Couples Families Friends
After ⇥ TripAdvisor 0.093** 0.176*** 0.104*** 0.111*
(2.43) (4.54) (2.71) (1.74)
Tripadvisor  0.846***  0.520***  1.223***  0.695
( 4.19) ( 3.56) ( 7.99) ( 1.28)
After 0.005  0.066*  0.025 0.019
(0.15) ( 1.88) ( 0.78) (0.30)
Ashenfelter’s dip correction Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 59886 41126 62282 14787
R2 within 0.0068 0.016 0.017 0.021
Note: The dependent variable is rating i of hotel j at time t. Cluster-robust t-statistics (at the
individual hotel level) are shown in parentheses. All specifications include time fixed e↵ects and
platform-specific linear time trends.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Changes in the review environment and reviewer selection. A di↵erent
type of concern with our results is that we have not accounted for changes in the
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review environment other than the adoption of management responses.24 A number
of papers, including Godes and Silva (2012) and Moe and Schweidel (2012), discuss
the role of the review environment consumers encounter on both the decision to leave
a review as well as the review’s valence. If the timing of the adoption of management
responses happens to coincide with changes in the review environment that result in
increased ratings, our estimates will be biased. In fact, as we have seen in Figure 2·5,
hotels do adopt management responses following an unusually large negative shocks
in their ratings, i.e., a change in their review environment. Given the dynamic
nature of changes in the review environment, the Ashenfelter’s dip correction we
have used so far may not fully correct for this type of bias. For instance, consider
the following hypothetical scenario. After a hotel receives a string of bad reviews,
two things happen: a) the hotel starts responding, and b) hotel guests who had a
positive experience start inflating their ratings to compensate for what they perceive
as inaccurately low prior ratings. In this case, it would be these “activist” reviewers
causing the increase in ratings, and not the management responses.25 To test the
robustness of our results to changes in review environment dynamics we include two
salient characteristics of the review environment as controls in our cross-platform DD
specification: for each review we compute (the log of) the number of TripAdvisor
reviews preceding it and the average rating of these prior reviews.
We report these results in the third column of Table 2.3. The impact of man-
agement responses on ratings remains robust to the inclusion of review environment
controls. However, some care is needed in interpreting the estimated coe cient for
the treatment e↵ect (Afterijt⇥TripAdvisorij). While in some cases (like the one de-
scribed in the previous paragraph) the inclusion of review environment controls will
correct for unobserved bias, in other cases, including review environment controls
24We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
25A priori, while this behavior in plausible, we think it is unlikely to persist over long periods.
Presumably, once the “correction” happens reviewers will stop inflating their ratings.
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could, in fact, introduce bias rather than correcting for it. Specifically, downward
bias can arise if the average rating of prior reviews positively a↵ects the value future
ratings. Prior empirical studies (e.g., Li and Hitt (2008)) find a positive association
between the two variables. This association can create the following feedback loop: a
hotel manager responds to a review; in turn, this results in a subsequent positive re-
view, which increases the hotel’s average rating; finally, the increased average rating
itself raises the incidence of positive reviews. Here, the average rating of prior re-
views mediates the relationship between management responses and current ratings.
More generally this type of bias arises when management responses cause changes
in reviewer selection, which then cause increases in ratings. However, even in such
cases, there is a useful way to interpret the di↵erence in the coe cients for the ATT
in the presence and absence of the review environment controls (columns 2 and 3 of
Table 2.3): their di↵erence captures the indirect e↵ect of management responses on
ratings through their positive impact on a hotel’s average rating.
Management response frequency. Our next robustness check is motivated by
variation in the rate with which hotels post management responses. So far, we re-
lied on a simple binary classification of treatment: reviews submitted prior to a
hotel’s first management response, and reviews following a hotel’s first management
response. However, in practice hotels respond to reviews with at di↵erent rates.
Therefore, it is unlikely that a hotel responding infrequently can obtain as big a ben-
efit from management responses as a hotel responding often. To test this hypothesis,
we construct a new variable, Pct. respondedijt which measures the fraction of re-
views that received a response on TripAdvisor prior to review i. We then introduce
an interaction of Pct. respondedijt with Afterijt⇥TripAdvisorij in our model, and we
re-estimate it. We present these results in the first column of Table 2.5. As hypoth-
esized, we find significant variation in the treatment e↵ect by management response
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frequency. The estimated interaction e↵ect, which we interpret as the di↵erential
impact of management response on hotels that almost never respond compared to
hotels that almost always respond, is 0.15(p < 0.01). This result suggests that hotels
stand to gain more by responding more often.
Table 2.5: Cross-platform DD by management response frequency and visibitily.
(1) (2) (3)
Frequency Visibility Visibility
After ⇥ TripAdvisor 0.091*** 0.101*** 0.100***
(3.47) (4.00) (3.92)
After ⇥ TripAdvisor ⇥ Pct. responded 0.154***
(4.29)
After ⇥ TripAdvisor ⇥ Pct. page 1 responded 0.084*** 0.062***
(4.08) (2.76)
After ⇥ TripAdvisor ⇥ Pct. page 2 responded 0.013
(1.34)
TripAdvisor  1.000***  1.014***  1.012***
( 19.70) ( 19.95) ( 19.91)
After  0.009  0.013  0.012
( 0.67) ( 0.99) ( 0.97)
Ashenfelter’s dip correction Yes Yes Yes
N 415361 415361 415361
R2 within 0.020 0.020 0.020
Note: The dependent variable is rating i of hotel j at time t. Cluster-robust t-statistics (at the individual
hotel level) are shown in parentheses. All specifications include time fixed e↵ects and platform-specific
linear time trends.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Management response visibility. Hotels not only respond with varying fre-
quency, but also with varying latency. Therefore, it may be the case that a hotel’s
most recent reviews, which are the ones that TripAdvisor visitors are more likely to
read, do not carry a management response. For example, in our data, 350 responding
hotels posted no additional management responses in 2013 even though these hotels
received 20 reviews on average in the same year. Reviewers who reviewed these hotels
in 2013 potentially never noticed these older management responses.
Our next robustness check is based on the intuition that the e↵ect of management
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Figure 2·6: Identifying the impact of management responses by ex-
ploiting variation in the likelihood of reading a management response.
Here, reviewer i is more likely to read the management response dis-
played on page 1 of the hotel’s reviews than reviewer i + 1. By the
time reviewer i+1 arrives to leave a review, the management response
is displayed on page 2, and is thus less likely to be read.
responses should be larger for reviewers who are more likely to have read them. While
we cannot precisely know which reviewers were exposed to management responses,
we can exploit the fact that TripAdvisor orders reviews by date and paginates them
ten to a page to construct a proxy. As an example, which we illustrate in Figure 2·6,
suppose that a hotel that has only responded to the last review displayed on its first
page of TripAdvisor reviews. Then, consider the hotel’s next two reviewers. After the
first reviewer leaves a review, the review carrying the management response will be
relegated to the hotel’s second page of reviews. Therefore, the second reviewer will be
less likely to read the management response than the first. Whether a management
response appears on the first or the second page of hotel’s reviews is unlikely to be
correlated with unobserved factors – such as renovations – that could also impact
the hotel’s ratings. Thus, the robustness check we perform here exploits variation in
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the likelihood with which reviewers are exposed to management responses to identify
their ATT.
Concretely, since reviewers are more likely to read the first page of reviews than
they are to click through and also read the second page of reviews, we construct the
variable Pct. page 1 respondedijt, which measures the fraction of the 10 most recent
reviews (i.e., the reviews on page 1) prior to review i that carried a response when
review i was posted. We then interact this proxy variable with Afterijt⇥TripAdvisorij
and re-estimate our model. We report these results in the second column of Table 2.5.
We find a positive and significant interaction e↵ect for Pct. page 1 respondedijt with
the main treatment e↵ect. This suggests that reviewers who are more likely to read
a management response are more likely to be a↵ected. Following the same logic, we
construct the variable Pct. page 2 respondedijt, which denotes the fraction of reviews
on page 2 that carry a management response. We re-estimate the cross-platform DD
model now including interactions for both the page 1 and page 2 proxies. We show
these results in the third column of Table 2.5. The estimate of the page 2 proxy is
smaller and it is not statistically significant, coinciding with our intuition that users
are less likely to be a↵ected by management responses on the second page of a hotel’s
reviews.
These robustness checks provide further reassurance that the e↵ect we measure
is due to management responses. Specifically, our results indicate that the impact
of responding is higher in situations where management responses are more likely
to have been read. By contrast, in situations where management responses are not
prominently displayed (e.g., on the second page of a hotel’s TripAdvisor reviews),
their impact is smaller. Further, these results are unlikely to be explained by hotel
renovations. While renovations are likely to drive increased ratings, we have less
reason to believe that hotel guests who value renovations more are also more likely
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to be exposed to a management response when they write a review following their
stay.
Management responses and review fraud. An identification concern arises
if hotels that adopt management responses simultaneously adopt other reputation
management strategies such as posting fake reviews. In this case, we may mistake
increases in ratings due to review fraud for increases in ratings due to management
responses, resulting in a positive bias in the ATT we estimate. Interestingly, the sign
of such bias can also be negative. If hotels choose to stop posting fraudulent reviews
when the option of directly responding to consumers becomes available to them, the
ATT we estimate will be biased downwards. Therefore, while this type of bias is
a concern, its direction will depend on whether management responses and review
fraud are substitutes or complements. Whether management responses encourage or
discourage review fraud activity is an interesting open question with implications for
the design of review platforms.
The cross-platform DD strategy is unlikely to su ciently control for bias arising
from review fraud because posting fake reviews is easier on TripAdvisor than it is
on Expedia: while any traveler can leave a review on TripAdvisor, Expedia requires
that users have paid-and-stayed.26 To check the robustness of our results against
this type of concern, we leverage the fact that review fraud incentives vary by hotel
organizational form. Specifically, prior work (Mayzlin et al., 2014; Luca and Zervas,
2015) has shown that chain-a liated firms are less likely to post fake reviews than
independent firms. This di↵erence in review fraud incentives arises for two reasons.
First, because chain hotels benefit less from consumer reviews (Luca, 2011) they
26Even though TripAdvisor allows anyone to post a review, it tries to ensure the integrity of
the content that it publishes. For more, see http://www.tripadvisor.com/vpages/review_mod_
fraud_detect.html. Therefore, not every fake review that is submitted to TripAdvisor will end up
being published. Similarly, even though Expedia requires that consumers paid-and-stayed, review
fraud is still possible: a hotel can create a fake reservation to allow it to post a fake review.
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have weaker incentives to commit review fraud in the first place. Second, if a chain
hotel is caught committing review fraud, there can be negative spillover e↵ects on
the reputation of the brand it is a liated with. For this reason, as Mayzlin et al.
(2014) point out, some chains have adopted social media policies that prohibit any-
one other than their guests (e.g., the chain’s employees) from posting (fake) reviews.
Based on this observation, we repeat our analysis separately for independent and
chain a liated hotels. We report these results in Table 2.6. Looking at chain hotels,
which are unlikely to commit review fraud, we find that the impact of management
responses on their ratings remains positive, significant, and has similar magnitude
to our previous estimates (0.11, p < 0.001). This result suggests that the ATT we
estimate is unlikely to be inflated due to review fraud. Intriguingly, we estimate a
larger ATT (0.19) for non-chains. While it is tempting to interpret this result as
evidence of independent hotel review fraud coinciding with the adoption of manage-
ment responses, it could also be that management responses have a stronger impact
on the reputation of independent hotels than the reputation of chains.
Table 2.6: Cross-platform DD by hotel a liation.
(1) (2)
Non-chain Chain
After ⇥ TripAdvisor 0.191*** 0.107***
(2.67) (5.44)
TripAdvisor  0.997***  1.041***
( 7.65) ( 21.15)
After  0.032  0.008
( 0.74) ( 0.65)
Ashenfelter’s dip correction Yes Yes
N 67548 350998
R2 within 0.019 0.020
Note: The dependent variable is rating i of hotel j at time t. Cluster-robust t-
statistics (at the individual hotel level) are shown in parentheses. All specifica-
tions include time fixed e↵ects and platform-specific linear time trends.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Di↵erence-in-di↵erences-in-di↵erences. As a final robustness check, we repli-
cate our results using the DDD strategy, which is more stringent than the double
di↵erencing methods we have used thus far. Our estimation sample now comprises
all responding and non-responding hotels on TripAdvisor, and their 1-1 matched con-
trol units on Expedia. Then, the DDD estimate compares post-treatment changes in
TripAdvisor ratings for responding hotels against the baseline of matched Expedia
ratings over the same period of time, and then adjusts this estimate for unobservable
trends by di↵erencing out cross-platform changes in ratings for non-responding hotels
over the same period of time. In other words, the DDD estimator is the di↵erence
between the cross-platform DD for responding and non-responding hotels:
DDD = DDrespondingcross-platform  DDnon-respondingcross-platform
The following model implements our DDD estimator:
Starsijt =  1Respondingj +  2TripAdvisorij (2.5)
+ 3Respondingj ⇥ TripAdvisorij
+ 3Respondingj ⇥ ⌧t +  3TripAdvisorij ⇥ ⌧t
+ Afterijt ⇥ Respondingj ⇥ TripAdvisorij +Xjt + ↵j + ⌧t + ✏ijt
The variables Respondingj⇥⌧t, and TripAdvisorij⇥⌧t are a full set of review-platform,
and treatment status specific time fixed e↵ects. The DDD estimate is  . Because
we can match TripAdvisor to Expedia ratings, we use matched-pair fixed e↵ects ↵j,
which subsumes the coe cient for Respondingj. We report our results, first without
and then with Ashenfelter’s dip correction, in Table 2.7. The DDD estimate (0.08
stars, p < 0.01) for the impact of management responses on subsequent ratings,
which controls for both cross-hotel and cross-platform unobservable trends as well
as Ashenfelter’s dip, supports our results so far.
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Table 2.7: DDD.
(1) (2)
After ⇥ Responding ⇥ TripAdvisor 0.113*** 0.081***
(6.59) (4.31)
TripAdvisor 0.923 0.896
(0.96) (0.93)
Responding ⇥⌧t Yes Yes
TripAdvisor ⇥⌧t Yes Yes
Ashenfelter’s dip correction No Yes
N 552051 537456
R2 within 0.021 0.021
Note: The dependent variable is rating i of hotel j at time t. Cluster-robust t-statistics (at
the individual hotel level) are shown in parentheses. All specifications include time fixed
e↵ects and platform-specific linear time trends.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
2.4.3 Results for within-platform identification
Arguably, the key concern with cross-platform identification is that di↵erencing does
not completely eliminate bias arising from unobserved di↵erences between TripAd-
visor and Expedia that may be correlated both with the adoption of management
responses and changes in hotel ratings. Here, we use the within-platform identi-
fication strategy described in Section 2.2.2 to estimate the impact of management
responses. We implement this identification strategy with the following model:
Starsijt =  1Respondingj +  Afterijt ⇥ Respondingj (2.6)
+Xjt + ⌘j ⇥Month Stayedijt + ⌧t + ✏ijt.
Here, the interactions ⌘j ⇥Month Stayedijt are hotel-month-of-stay specific fixed ef-
fects. The precision of these fixed e↵ects is at the month level because TripAdvisor
does not disclose exact dates of travel, likely to protect user privacy. In total, our
model contains over 110,000 such fixed e↵ects in addition to time fixed-e↵ects and
linear time trends by treatment status. (Perhaps surprisingly, some variation remains
in our data after we introduce all of these controls.) The e↵ect of management re-
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sponses is identified by variation in the di↵erence between the ratings of TripAdvisor
reviewers who left a review prior to a hotel’s adoption of management responses and
the ratings of TripAdvisor reviewers who stayed at the same hotel during the same
month, but left a review following a hotel’s adoption of management responses.
While this identification strategy mitigates the concern of unobserved hotel reno-
vations, bias can arise if the elapsed time between staying at a hotel and reviewing it
is correlated with the guest’s rating. To account for endogeneity arising from review
timing we include as controls the time elapsed between a review and a stay, as well
as the square of the same variable (to allow for non-linear e↵ects.) We report these
results in the first column of Table 2.8. In the second column, we also correct for
Ashenfelter’s dip to account for the fact that hotels tend to start responding when
they experience negative shocks to their ratings. We find a positive and significant
impact for responding whose magnitude coincides with our results so far.
As a final robustness check, in the last three columns, we repeat our robustness
checks for response frequency and visibility. As before, we confirm that the impact
of management responses is stronger for hotels that respond often and for reviewers
who are more likely to have read them.
2.4.4 Robustness to alternative functional forms
One issue with our analysis so far is that we have modeled an ordered discrete out-
come (the 1 to 5-star rating associated with each review) using a continuous linear
model. While this modeling choice is common in the literature on reviews, it can
potentially lead to bias. In this section, we repeat our analysis using a general-
ized ordered probit specification, which reflects our data generating process more
accurately. We begin by briefly describing the generalized ordered probit model –
for a complete description see Terza (1985). The model posits that the cumulative
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Table 2.8: Within-plaform identification: Comparing the TripAdvisor ratings of travelers
who stayed at the same hotel the same month.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After 0.276*** 0.121** 0.091 0.101 0.099
(8.02) (1.97) (1.48) (1.64) (1.61)
After ⇥ Pct. responded 0.365***
(3.86)
After ⇥ Pct. page 1 responded 0.067*** 0.056***
(3.89) (2.63)
After ⇥ Pct. page 2 responded 0.010
(0.89)
Time between review & stay 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038***
(4.56) (4.54) (4.67) (4.55) (4.56)
Time between review & stay2  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***
( 4.15) ( 4.26) ( 4.28) ( 4.27) ( 4.27)
Ashenfelter’s dip correction No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 308261 299295 299295 299295 299295
R2 within 0.0029 0.0025 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026
Note: The dependent variable is rating i of hotel j at time t. Cluster-robust t-statistics (at the indi-
vidual hotel-month level) are shown in parentheses. All specifications include time fixed e↵ects and
treatment-status specific linear time trends.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
probabilities of the discrete outcomes (the star ratings) are given by:
Pr[Starsijt  s | xijk, zijk] =  (s + x0ijk s + z0ijk ) s = 1 to 4, (2.7)
where   is the cumulative normal distribution. Compared to the standard ordered
probit, the generalized model allows some of its coe cients (the  s) to vary by out-
come. This generalization relaxes the parallel regressions assumption of the standard
ordered probit model, and allows the e↵ect of covariates to vary across outcomes.
We begin by estimating the generalized ordered probit model on the TripAdvisor
ratings of responding hotels. In the set of threshold-varying controls we include an
indicator Afterijt denoting the post-responses period. In addition, to flexibly control
for unobserved time trends, we also include a set of time dummies (whose coe cients
we do not allow to vary by outcome, to avoid introducing too many parameters in
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the model.)
We estimate the model using MLE and compute standard errors clustered at
the hotel level with a non-parametric bootstrap. We report our results in the first
column of Table 2.9. While these estimates are not as easily interpretable as in
the linear case, in general, a set of positive and significant coe cients (as we find
here) suggest an increase in the probability of higher ratings. To arrive at more
interpretable estimates we also compute average marginal probability e↵ects (MPEs)
as described in Boes and Winkelmann (2006). Omitting irrelevant subscripts for
simplicity, marginal probability e↵ects are defined as:
MPEsl(x) = @Pr[Stars  s | x, z]/@ (l)s (2.8)
=  (s + x
0 s) (l)     (s 1 + x0 s) (l)s 1
where  (l)s denotes lth item of the vector  s. Then, the average MPEs are defined as
Ex[MPEsl(x)], and they should be interpreted as average probability changes given
a marginal change in the covariate of interest. Average MPEs can be consistently
estimated using the estimated model parameters in place of the true parameters. We
report average MPEs and bootstrap standard errors (clustered at the hotel level) for
Afterijt in the first column of Table 2.10. We find that the likelihood of receiving a
5-star review increases by approximately 7% following the adoption of management
responses. Meanwhile, the probability of a 1-star rating decreases by nearly 3%.
These results are in line with our previous DD estimates using a linear model.
In the spirit of DD, we also perform a falsification check. Specifically, we re-
estimate the same generalized ordered probit model using, this time, the Expedia
reviews of these same hotels that respond on TripAdvisor. Here, we set the variable
Afterijt to 1 for all Expedia reviews following each hotel’s first management response
on TripAdvisor. We report these estimates and their associated average MPEs in the
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second column of Tables 2.9 and 2.10. As we would have hoped, we find no change
in the Expedia ratings of responding hotels following their adoption of management
responses on TripAdvisor.
Overall, the results in this section corroborate our previous analyses suggesting
that our DD estimates are unlikely to be driven by functional form misspecification.
Table 2.9: Generalized ordered probit.
(1) (2)
TripAdvisor Expedia
Threshold 1|2
After 0.217*** 0.040
(6.10) (1.03)
Threshold 2|3
After 0.192*** 0.032
(5.37) (0.81)
Threshold 3|4
After 0.188*** 0.021
(5.05) (0.53)
Threshold 4|5
After 0.187*** 0.016
(4.99) (0.47)
N 169530 263804
Note: The dependent variable is rating i of hotel j at time t. Boost-
rap standard errors shown in paretheses. All specifications include
year fixed e↵ects and platform-specific linear time trends.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
2.5 Why do management responses a↵ect hotel ratings?
In this section, we investigate the mechanism underlying our findings. We argue
that management responses can improve hotel ratings because they increase the cost
to the consumer of leaving a negative review, while making it more worthwhile to
leave a positive one. Intuitively, the cost of negative reviews increases because when
hotels respond consumers feel that their reviews will be closely scrutinized; therefore,
consumers become less likely to submit low-quality negative reviews. On the other
hand, consumers considering leaving a positive review likely appreciate the hotel
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Table 2.10: Average marginal probability e↵ects
from the generalized ordered probit model.
(1) (2)
TripAdvisor Expedia
1 star  0.029***  0.004
( 6.39) ( 1.03)
2 stars  0.014***  0.002
( 3.60) ( 0.55)
3 stars  0.019***  0.000
( 3.57) ( 0.04)
4 stars  0.012**  0.000
( 2.06) ( 0.02)
5 stars 0.074*** 0.006
(5.00) (0.47)
N 169530 263804
Note: Boostrap standard errors shown in paretheses. All
specifications include year fixed e↵ects and platform spe-
cific linear time trends.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
reading their review and responding to it; therefore, hotel guests are more likely to
submit a positive review when hotels take notice of their feedback. To empirically
support this argument, we analyze the impact of management responses on review
volume, review length, and the types of reviewers a hotel attracts. Beyond helping
us understand the mechanism underlying our findings, these analyses yield insights
on managerially relevant variables other than star-ratings.
Our first finding is that the length of negative reviews tends to increase after hotels
begin responding. To arrive at this result, we analyze review length (measured in
characters) as a dependent variable using the same cross-platform DD strategy as in
Equation 2.1. Negative reviews on TripAdvisor are, on average, longer than positive
reviews. Therefore, we separately estimate the impact of management responses
on review length for each star-rating and report these results in columns 2–6 of
Table 2.11. Because the average TripAdvisor rating of responding hotels is 3.8 stars,
we define negative reviews as those with 1, 2 or 3 stars, and positive reviews as
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those with 4 or 5 stars. We find that reviewers leave 1 and 2-star reviews that
are approximately 10% longer after hotels begin responding. The impact on 3-star
reviews is smaller while the length of positive reviews remains unchanged. Thus,
we find that hotel managers who consider responding to reviews face an interesting
trade-o↵: by responding they can increase their average star rating at the cost of
receiving longer, and therefore more detailed, negative reviews.
More interestingly, this finding can also help us explain why management re-
sponses increase hotel ratings. Hotel guests feel the need to leave longer and more
detailed reviews when they believe that hotel managers will scrutinize their com-
ments and publicly respond. For some guests, writing a longer and more detailed
negative review will be worth the time and e↵ort. Others, however, will not be mo-
tivated to expend this extra e↵ort, and instead opt not to leave any review at all. In
other words, management responses increase the cost of writing a negative review.
Second, we find that following a hotel’s decision to begin responding, total review
volume increases. Since on average ratings also increase, these extra reviews are
mostly positive. As before, we analyze review volume using the cross-platform DD
strategy in Equation 2.1. Specifically, we estimate the percentage change in the
number of reviews a hotel receives after it begins responding on TripAdvisor relative
to percentage increases on Expedia over the same period of time. To do so, we
first aggregate our data at the hotel-month level. Then, our dependent variable is
log Review countjt, i.e., the logarithm of the number of reviews hotel j received in
month t. As before we cluster errors at the hotel level. We report these results in
the first column of Table 2.11. We find that the number of reviews a hotel receives
increases by 12% following its decision to begin responding.27 Why does review
volume increase? Plainly, we think that positive reviewers who might have otherwise
not left a review, are more willing to provide feedback when the hotel has signaled
27A fixed-e↵ects Poisson model gives a similar estimate.
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that it is listening. We also point out that, all else being equal, an increased number
of reviews is a desirable outcome, because it is often interpreted as a sign of hotel
popularity and, thus, quality.
Table 2.11: The impact of management responses on rewiewing activity and review length.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Review length
Num. reviews 1-star 2-stars 3-stars 4-stars 5-stars
After ⇥ TripAdvisor 0.12*** 88.35*** 93.24*** 47.92*** 19.60 8.28
(4.57) (3.88) (3.83) (2.79) (1.51) (0.51)
TripAdvisor  0.68*** 849.81*** 1021.08*** 981.80*** 890.98*** 717.68***
( 14.78) (17.57) (21.72) (24.64) (27.62) (17.64)
After 0.01  0.50  10.84  13.63  6.13  10.84*
(0.70) ( 0.03) ( 0.87) ( 1.62) ( 1.18) ( 1.73)
Ashenfelter’s dip correction Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 122350 22754 28427 51300 120319 192561
R2 within 0.24 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.21
Note: The dependent variable in column (1) is the log of the number of reviews of hotel j at time t. The dependent variable
in columns (2-6) is the length of review i of hotel j at time t. Cluster-robust t-statistics (at the individual hotel level) are
shown in parentheses. All specifications include time fixed e↵ects and platform-specific linear time trends.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Third, we argue that if there is an increased benefit of leaving positive reviews
when hotels respond, then reviewers who are inherently more positive should be
more likely to review a given hotel. We define an inherently positive reviewer as
one who tends to leave more positive reviews than the average TripAdvisor reviewer.
To show that responding hotels attract inherently positive reviewers, we begin with
the observation that a reviewer’s rating for a specific business can be thought of as
consisting of three separable components: the reviewer’s type ✓k, i.e., how inherently
positive, or negative a reviewer is overall; the business’s type, i.e., the overall quality
of a hotel ⌘j; and, the reviewer’s experience at the hotel during a specific trip ✏jk.28
Then, we model the rating of reviewer k for business j as
Starsjk = ✓k + ⌘j + ✏jk. (2.9)
This model allows us to estimate the reviewer fixed e↵ects ✓k using a dataset con-
28Dai et al. (2012) take a similar approach in deconstructing consumer ratings, and demonstrate
how it provides a more accurate prediction of a business’ true quality.
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taining each reviewer’s entire TripAdvisor review history.
Then, we test the hypothesis that hotels start attracting reviewers who are inher-
ently more positive (i.e., reviewers with higher values of ✓k) after they start respond-
ing. To do this, we estimate the following regression on the TripAdvisor reviews of
both responding and non-responding hotels:
Reviewer typeijt =  Afterijt + ⌘j + ⌧t + ✏jk. (2.10)
Here, the dependent variable Reviewer typeijt is the value of ✓k associated with the
reviewer who wrote review i for hotel j (as estimated using Equation 2.9.) Afterijt
is an indicator for reviews submitted after hotel j starts responding. The coe cient
of interest,  , captures changes in the inherent positivity of reviewers of responding
hotels after they start responding. To further limit the influence of unobserved tran-
sient factors that could a↵ect reviewer selection, we borrow an idea from regression
discontinuity designs: we limit our estimation sample to one year before, and one
year after the treatment, since any two reviewers are more likely to be comparable
in their unobserved characteristics if their reviews are closer in time. We present our
results in Table 2.12. As hypothesized, we find that management responses a↵ect
reviewer selection: reviewers who submit reviews after hotels start responding are,
on average, 0.09 stars more positive than the population of reviewers who submitted
reviews prior to management responses. A robustness check with a smaller band-
width of six months yields similar results. This finding further supports the idea
that management responses make leaving a positive review more worthwhile: before
hotels started responding, these inherently positive reviewers were not motivated
enough to leave a review. How strong is the link between between better ratings fol-
lowing the adoption of management responses and a change in reviewer selection? If
the sole e↵ect of management responses were to attract consumers who leave reviews
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that are on average 0.09-stars higher, we should expect to see to a 0.09-star increase
in the ratings of responding hotels, which is indeed close to the ATT we estimate.
Table 2.12: Change in reviewer types following a ho-
tel’s decision to begin responding.
(1) (2)
BW= ±6 months BW= ±12 months
After 0.094*** 0.090***
(8.65) (10.05)
N 42600 77599
R2 within 0.0027 0.0022
Note: The dependent variable is the reviewer type ✓k associated
with the consumer k who reviewed hotel j at time t. Cluster-
robust t-statistics (at the individual hotel level) are shown in
parentheses. All specifications include hotel fixed e↵ects.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
2.5.1 Management responses and review reciprocity
As a step towards grounding our findings in theory, we briefly highlight a theoretical
connection between our results and the literature on reciprocity in review platforms.
A number of field and lab studies (Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002; Dellarocas and
Wood, 2008; Bolton et al., 2013) have shown that in settings where agents can
sequentially rate each other, negative ratings are underreported, because of a fear
of reciprocation. The primary example of this phenomenon is eBay. Up to 2008,
during which time eBay buyers and sellers could rate each other, buyers with a
poor experience would often avoid leaving a negative review for a seller for fear that
the seller would also follow up with a negative review. When eBay introduced new
rules that removed the option for sellers to leave negative feedback for buyers, sellers
started receiving an increased number of negative reviews (Hui et al., 2014). More
recently, Airbnb has faced similar issues (Fradkin et al., 2014; Zervas et al., 2015a).
Here, we draw a parallel between eBay and TripAdvisor: we think of responding
hotels as participating in a review platform where reciprocation is a possibility –
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similar to eBay’s old reputation system – and, non-responding hotels as participating
in a review platform where reviews will not be reciprocated – similar to eBay’s new
reputation system. By responding to past guests, hotels signal to future reviewers
that they may reciprocate a bad review, discouraging some guests with a negative
experience from leaving a review altogether. Overall, this behavior can shift reviewer
selection towards reviewers with higher ratings, and, on average, improve the ratings
a responding hotel receives.
A limitation of using the reciprocation theory to explain our findings is that hotels
on TripAdvisor cannot provide an actual star-rating for their guests, which would
visibly harm their online reputation. The main risk a reviewer faces in leaving a neg-
ative TripAdvisor review is that of receiving an antagonistic management response.
The direct economic consequences of an antagonistic management response are not
clear, and better understanding them is an interesting area for future research. Nev-
ertheless, some existing research (Ockenfels et al., 2012) suggests that consumers
place more value on their online reputation than economic incentives alone would
predict. For instance, the threat of an antagonistic management response may incur
social and emotional costs that can a↵ect a reviewer’s decision to leave a negative
review.
2.5.2 Other mechanisms to explain our findings
A change in the cost for a consumer to leave a review is not the only explanation
for our results. Here, we briefly discuss a second mechanism that could in principle
explain our findings. Drawing from the service failure and recovery literature (e.g.,
Tax et al. (1998); Smith et al. (1999); McCollough et al. (2000)), we show that re-
viewers who received a management response after leaving a negative review were
more likely to leave a second review than reviewers who did not receive a response.
Moreover, this second review is on average more positive than their initial review.
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Nevertheless, while both of these findings are consistent with the predictions of ser-
vice recovery theory, the number of reviews by returning consumers is so small that
it cannot adequately explain the full extent of the ratings increase that responding
hotels experience. In our data, 1.3% of TripAdvisor reviews are from consumers who
have rated the same hotel in the past. Among responding hotels this fraction is
slightly higher, 1.4%.
We begin our analysis by testing the hypothesis that consumers who receive a
management response are more likely to return, and leave a second review. To do
so, we estimate the following logistic regression model
Returning consumerkj =  Received responsekj + ⌘j + ✏kj, (2.11)
where Returning consumerkj is an indicator variable that is set to 1 if consumer k
has left more than one review for hotel j, Received responsekj is an indicator variable
set to 1 for consumers who received a management response for their initial review
of hotel j, and ⌘j is a hotel fixed e↵ect. We present our results in the first column
of Table 2.13. We find that consumers who received a management response are
9% more likely to provide a second review that those who didn’t receive a response.
Because hotels respond to positive as well as to negative reviews, and service recovery
e↵orts are typically aimed at dissatisfied consumers, we repeat our analysis limiting
our estimation sample to consumers whose initial review was below 3 stars. By
limiting our analysis to 1- and 2-star reviews we also exclude many reviewers who
return to the hotel, not because of the management response, but because the failure
the experienced was not that severe. Our results, in the second column of Table 2.13,
show that dissatisfied consumers who receive a response are even more likely (43%
= e0.361) to return, a behavior consistent with the predictions of the service recovery
theory.
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Table 2.13: Logistic regression of the probability of a second
review by the same consumer as a function of receiving a man-
agement response.
(1) (2)
All Reviews Only stars < 3
Received response 0.088** 0.361**
(1.99) (2.10)
N 211424 7023
Note: The dependent variable is an indicator of whether a consumer re-
viewed the same hotel twice. The independent variable is an indicator of
whether a consumer’s first review received a response. All the specifica-
tions include hotel fixed e↵ects.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Next, we turn our attention to comparing the di↵erence in ratings between a re-
turning consumer’s first and second reviews as a function of receiving a management
response for the first review.29 While we might expect any returning hotel guest to
anticipate a better second experience, we isolate the impact of management responses
by estimating the additional change in ratings for consumers who received a man-
agement response compared against a baseline of returning consumers who didn’t.
To do so, we construct a dataset containing the first and second reviews of every
consumer who left at least two reviews, and we estimate the following regression
model:
Starsikj = 12
nd reviewikj +  2Received responsekj (2.12)
+  Received responsekj ⇥ 2nd reviewikj + ⌘j + ✏ikj.
The dependent variable is the ith rating of consumer k for hotel j, Received responsekj
is an indicator for consumers who received a response for their first review of hotel
29Even though consumers can write more than two reviews for the same hotel, few consumers
in our data provide three or more reviews for the same establishment. For simplicity, we focus on
the first and second reviews of each consumer for a specific hotel. Specifically, 3,733 consumers
return at least once to the same hotel, for a total of 7,860 reviews. Excluding their first reviews,
these consumers produced 4,127 reviews (1.3% of total reviews). 335 of these consumers return
more than twice. Excluding their first and second reviews, these consumers wrote an additional
390 reviews (0.12% of total reviews).
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j, and 2nd reviewikj is an indicator for this being the consumer’s second review for
hotel j. As before, we limit our analysis to consumers whose first rating is below 3
stars. The coe cient of interest,  , has the standard DD interpretation. Our results,
shown in Table 2.14, indicate that returning consumers are more positive by 0.8 stars,
but those who receive a response increase their second ratings by almost half a star,
highlighting the e↵ect of the service recovery e↵orts. Unfortunately, as indicated
by the small sample size of this analysis (N = 400), the aggregate e↵ect of such
improved ratings on hotel reputation is insignificant. In fact, our main results from
Section 2.4 remain practically unchanged when we exclude returning reviewers from
our data.Therefore, while management responses can contribute to the recovery of
individual consumers who experienced a service failure, the total number of reviews
created from such recovery e↵orts is too small to adequately explain the magnitude
of the e↵ect of management responses on hotel ratings.
Table 2.14: Change in the star rating of a consumer’s second
review, as function of the first review receiving a response.
(1)
Received Response ⇥ Second Review 0.461**
(2.17)
Received Response 0.363
(0.56)
Second Review 0.832***
(7.06)
N 400
R2 within 0.32
Note: The dependent variable is the star of the current review.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Chapter 3
The rise of the sharing economy:
Estimating the impact of Airbnb on the
hotel industry
3.1 Introduction
The emergence of multi-sided technology platforms, collectively known as the shar-
ing economy, has enabled individuals to collaboratively make use of under-utilized
inventory via fee-based sharing. Consumers have so far enthusiastically adopted the
services o↵ered by firms such as Airbnb, Uber, Lyft, and TaskRabbit. The rapid
growth of peer-to-peer platforms has been aided by their ability to scale supply in a
near frictionless manner as well as the rich selection of goods and services they have
on o↵er. As an example, Airbnb, a provider of travel accommodation and a pioneer
of the sharing economy, has served over 30 million guests since it was founded in
2008. Although Airbnb remains privately held, its valuation of over $10 billion now
exceeds that of well-established global hotel chains like Hyatt. Yet incumbent firms,
despite both facing higher marginal costs and o↵ering less personalized products
than peer-to-peer platforms, have mostly downplayed competition from platforms
like Airbnb. For example, hotel executives have publicly issued largely dismissive
statements regarding competitors like Airbnb, arguing that these peer-to-peer plat-
forms are either a small niche market or that they target complementary market
segments from that targeted by hotel chains. Interestingly, Airbnb appears to also
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espouse this latter view: according to Airbnb, “76% of Airbnb properties are outside
the main hotel districts”, suggesting complementarity of their o↵erings.
In this study, we provide empirical evidence to this debate by studying the im-
pact of Airbnb’s entry in Texas market on hotel revenues. We hypothesize that stays
with Airbnb serve as a substitute for certain hotel stays, and that Airbnb has a
measurable and quantifiable impact on hotel revenue in a↵ected areas. Our study
explores the relationship between Airbnb and hotels in the state of Texas by estimat-
ing monthly hotel room revenue as a function of Airbnb entry in the market. Using
data we collected from Airbnb, and monthly hotel room revenue from approximately
3,000 hotels in Texas dating back to 2003, we quantify the extent to which Airbnb
penetration has negatively impacted hotel room revenue. Our main result is that in
areas where Airbnb is most popular the revenue of the most vulnerable hotels in our
data has decreased by about 8-10% over the past five years.
To identify the causal impact of Airbnb on hotel revenue we employ a di↵erence-
in-di↵erences empirical strategy. Specifically, due to the significant variability in
both the temporal rate and the spatial density of Airbnb adoption, as well as the
geographic specificity of both our hotel and Airbnb datasets, we are able to treat
Airbnb market entry as a variable intervention in space and time against the hotel
room revenue data. Our DD strategy identifies the Airbnb treatment e↵ect by com-
paring di↵erences in revenue for hotels in cities a↵ected by Airbnb before and after
Airbnb’s entry against a baseline of di↵erences in revenue for hotels in cities unaf-
fected by Airbnb over the same period of time. Using this DD specification we find
that, in Texas, each additional 10% increase in the size of the Airbnb market resulted
in a 0.37% decrease in hotel room revenue. To calibrate the economic significance
of this result, it is worth pointing out that in certain Texas municipalities (notably,
Austin), Airbnb inventory has grown exponentially over the past few years, resulting
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in an estimated revenue impact of over 8-10% for the most vulnerable hotels in our
data.
Our DD specification allows for both time-invariant di↵erences in revenue be-
tween hotels as well as common time-varying shocks to revenue across hotels. The
key threat to identification potentially arises in the form of unobservable (to the
researcher) city-specific, time-varying factors that di↵erentially a↵ect hotel room
revenue depending on the intensity of Airbnb adoption within each city at a given
point in time. To test the robustness of our DD estimate, we perform a series of
checks. First, we show that our estimate for Airbnb’s impact on hotel room revenue
is robust to a number of covariates that vary by location and over time (e.g., country-
specific population, unemployment rate, and total hotel room supply measured at the
city level). Second, following common DD practice, we allow for flexible city-specific
trends (e.g., linear, or quadratic), which can parametrically control for unobserved
endogenous trends that vary by city (the same level at which we observe variation
in Airbnb supply). Third, we show that the basic set of controls included in our DD
specification (i.e., hotel fixed e↵ects and temporal trends) explain approximately
95% of the variation in Airbnb supply. Therefore, little variation in Airbnb supply
remains unexplained by our model, and could potentially be driven by unobserved
factors that also a↵ect hotel room revenue. Fourth, we check whether Airbnb adop-
tion is driven by hotel performance, which would be a case of our confusing cause
and e↵ect. To the contrary, we find that a wide range of pre-Airbnb demographic
and market characteristics – including, for example, hotel room prices, occupancy
rates, and hotel room supply per city – that are significant predictors of post-Airbnb
hotel room revenue, are not correlated with the patterns of Airbnb adoption we see
in our data. Finally, in a separate analysis, we combine DD with coarsened exact
matching (Iacus et al., 2012) to further reduce endogeneity concerns. Specifically,
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we first match each hotel a↵ected by Airbnb to una↵ected hotels belonging to same
price-tier and sharing the same a liation, discarding hotels that remain unmatched.
The intuition behind matching is that similar hotels (e.g., an upscale Hilton in Austin
where Airbnb adoption is high, and an upscale Hilton in Dallas where Airbnb pen-
etration is low) are less likely to di↵er in unobserved ways. We find that our CEM
DD estimate is similar to our main DD analysis. Taken together, these robustness
checks provide significant support for the assumptions underlying our DD analysis.
We then move to investigate both the mechanisms behind Airbnb’s impact on
hotel room revenue and the market response to Airbnb entry. With respect to mech-
anisms, given the nature of rentals on Airbnb today, which typically provide fewer
amenities and services than many hotels, we expect those hotels providing more dif-
ferentiated services to be less a↵ected. We start by examining two such cases: high-
end hotels and hotels catering to business travelers, both of which provide amenities
that a typical Airbnb stay does not. First, after segmenting hotels in five industry-
standard price tiers (Budget, Economy, Midprice, Upscale, and Luxury) we find the
impact of Airbnb is gradually magnified as we move down the price tiers. Then,
through a similar analysis, using conference and meeting room space as a proxy
for the extent to which a hotel caters to business travel, we find that the impact
of Airbnb also falls disproportionately on those hotels lacking conference facilities.
Finally, we examine Airbnb’s di↵erential impact on chain versus independent ho-
tels, expecting that chain hotels will be less a↵ected, for reasons ranging from larger
marketing budgets and stronger brands to providing predictably consistent service.
In contrast, independent hotels exhibit more variability and perhaps more inconsis-
tency, as we would also expect with Airbnb properties. Indeed, our analysis confirms
that the impact of Airbnb on independent hotels is disproportionately larger. Fi-
nally, with respect to market response, we study the extent to which a↵ected hotels
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react to Airbnb’s market entry. Using hotel industry performance metrics, we find
a statistically significant decrease in occupancy rate and an even bigger decrease in
hotel room prices.30 Notably, such a price response benefits all consumers, not just
participants in the sharing economy.
3.1.1 Related Work
Relatively few empirical papers have yet studied the sharing economy and its inter-
play with incumbent firms o↵ering similar goods or services. A handful of studies
have examined the adoption and e↵ects of car-sharing, for example, two studies have
used survey analysis methods to find that car-sharing is associated with significant
decreases in miles traveled, gasoline consumption, and car ownership (Cervero et al.,
2007; Martin et al., 2010). As for accommodation sharing, we find a large number
of opinion pieces in the popular press and on blogs, but little in the way of academic
literature. Our closest comparison point is a set of short studies commissioned by
Airbnb, which claim that the Airbnb business model is complementary to the ho-
tel industry, but primarily focus on arguing for and quantifying the substantial net
economic benefit to cities that Airbnb travelers provide.31 While our work is related
to these studies, we apply a more sophisticated identification strategy, methodology,
and segmentation analysis, resulting in conclusions that are both di↵erent and more
nuanced.
Our work contributes to the growing literature on multi-sided platform competi-
tion, as Airbnb exemplifies a two-sided platform. Much of this literature establishes
the economic theory of two-sided markets, for example through structural models
that establish theories of price structure and usage (Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Rys-
man, 2009; Weyl, 2010), and models which connect innovations in product design
30These findings are consistent with a recent analysis conducted by Credit Suisse. See: http:
//www.tnooz.com/article/airbnb-responsible-softening-new-york-revpar/.
31See: https://www.airbnb.com/economic-impact/.
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to network e↵ects (Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005). Other work, more closely re-
lated to our own, contributes empirical results to the literature that seek to explain
the behavior of firms and individuals in two-sided markets (Jin and Rysman, 2012),
including the role of multihoming (Landsman and Stremersch, 2011), modeling re-
sponse to regulation (Carbo´ Valverde et al., 2010), and understanding the supply-side
labor market (Hall and Krueger, 2015). Our work, in contrast to these, empirically
studies a setting where a two-sided platform o↵ers a substitute for consumer services
supplied by traditional firms.
It is in this latter context that our work contributes to the literature on sub-
stitution between online and o✏ine markets, as firms like Airbnb can be viewed as
providing enabling technology that facilitates suppliers of niche inventory to bring
their products to market. In contrast to o✏ine markets, Airbnb provides su ciently
low cost of revenue for individuals to profitably list remnant inventory online; more-
over, Airbnb provides enhanced reach by reducing consumer search costs (Bakos,
1997). As such, our study can be viewed as investigating the consequences of an
online platform lowering the barrier to entry for suppliers. Related work has studied
similar examples in other domains. For example, a number of recent studies have
focused on the impact of Craigslist – a website featuring free online classified ads – on
the newspaper industry. Seamans and Zhu (2013) estimate the e↵ect of Craigslist’s
market entry on several newspaper performance metrics. They find that in the face
of increasing competition by Craigslist, newspapers with greater reliance on classified
ad revenue responded by reducing their ad rates, and by increasing their subscription
prices more than newspapers whose revenue were less reliant on advertising. Kroft
and Pope (2014) estimate that Craigslist’s entry resulted in a 7% reduction in the
volume of classified ads appearing in newspapers during the period between January
2005 and April 2007. Further, they estimate that Craiglist’s entry caused a decrease
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in the rental vacancy rate by approximately 1%. Our work shares a methodological
trait with these studies: all of them rely on the temporal and geographic variation in
Craigslist’s entry to identify its e↵ect. We exploit similar variation in the patterns
of Airbnb adoption to measure its impact on hotel room revenue.
Finally, our work contributes to the literature studying the impact of external
shocks on the tourism and the hospitality industry. Much of the prior work though,
has centered on demand shocks. For example, O’Connor et al. (2008) study the
impact of terrorism on tourism in Ireland; Baker and Coulter (2007) estimate the
impact of the 2002 and 2005 terrorist attacks in Bali on the islands’ vendors. Simi-
larly, Kosova´ and Enz (2012) examine the adverse e↵ects of the 9/11 attack and the
2008 financial crisis on hotel performance.
3.2 Data and the Airbnb Platform
For our study, we collect and combine data from various sources including the Airbnb
website, the Texas Comptroller O ce, Smith Travel Research (STR), county demo-
graphics from the U.S. Census Bureau, and the Current Population Survey (CPS)
from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
3.2.1 The Airbnb Platform
Much of the data used in our study is collected directly from the Airbnb website.
Airbnb defines itself as “a social website that connects people who have space to
spare with those who are looking for a place to stay”, and exemplifies a peer-to-peer
marketplace in the sharing economy. Prospective hosts list their spare rooms or
apartments on the Airbnb platform, establish their own nightly, weekly or monthly
price, and o↵er accommodation to guests. Airbnb derives revenue from both guests
and hosts for this service: guests pay a 9   12% service fee for each reservation
they make, depending on the length of their stay, and hosts pay a 3% service fee
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to cover the cost of processing payments. Since its launch in 2008, the Airbnb
online marketplace has experienced very rapid growth, with more than one million
properties worldwide and 30 million guests that used the service by the end of 2014
(18M of which was in the past year).32
Airbnb’s business model currently operates with minimal regulatory controls in
most locations, and as a result, hosts and guests both have incentives to use signalling
mechanisms to build trust and maximize the likelihood of a successful booking. To
reinforce this behavior, Airbnb has built an online reputation system that enables
and encourages participants to rate and review each completed stay. Guests use star
ratings to rate features of their stay, e.g., cleanliness, location, and communication,
while both guests and hosts are encouraged to post public reviews of each stay on
the platform.
3.2.2 Airbnb Data: Listings and Market Entry
To estimate the extent of Airbnb’s market entry, we collected consumer-facing infor-
mation from airbnb.com on the complete set of users who had listed their properties
in the state of Texas for rental on Airbnb.
We refer to these users as hosts, and their properties as their listings. Each host
is associated with a set of attributes including a photo, a personal statement, their
listings, guest reviews of their properties, and Airbnb-certified contact information.
Similarly, each listing displays attributes including location, price, a brief textual
description, photos, capacity, availability, check-in and check-out times, cleaning
fees, and security deposits. Figures A·1 and A·2 in the AppendixA display a typical
Airbnb user profile and a typical Airbnb listing, respectively. Our collected dataset
contains detailed information on 10, 555 distinct hosts and 13, 935 distinct listings
spanning a period from 2008 to August 2014.
32See http://www.cnbc.com/id/102389442.
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We quantify Airbnb supply over time at the granularity of individual cities as
follows: for a given city and date, we count the number of distinct listings that
have (cumulatively) appeared on Airbnb in that city prior to that date. We approx-
imate the unobservable entry date of individual listings by using the prominently
displayed date their owners became Airbnb members. We note that instantaneous
supply fluctuates continuously, as some Airbnb hosts take properties on and o↵ the
market. Nevertheless, due to Airbnb’s exponential growth, at any given point in
time, cumulative supply strongly correlates with instantaneous supply.
While the presence of Airbnb listings in a city clearly does not by itself impact
hotels, regressing hotel room revenue on Airbnb supply produces a meaningful coe -
cient estimate. We interpret a statistically significant negative coe cient on Airbnb
supply as indicating that Airbnb listings lead to Airbnb bookings that substitute
for hotel stays and impact hotel room revenue. We interpret a coe cient that is
not statistically significantly di↵erent from zero as indicating that Airbnb listings
having no e↵ect on hotels. We interpret a positive coe cient, though implausible,
as indicating that Airbnb listings benefit hotels.
Separately, we must choose an appropriate level of geographic aggregation. Here,
our data is suitably granular (with location accuracy to roughly 100 meters) to permit
analysis at many di↵erent scales. Our choice of city-level granularity is driven by
the observation that a city is the largest geographic unit within which we reasonably
expect to see significant substitution patterns between hotels and Airbnb properties.
3.2.3 Hotel Data: Revenue, Prices, and Occupancy Rates
The main dependent variable we use in our analysis is monthly hotel room revenue,
which we obtained from public records furnished by the Texas Comptroller’s o ce,
in their capacity as auditors of state tax collection.33 In addition to monthly hotel
33Available at http://aixtcp.cpa.state.tx.us/hotel/hotel_qtr_all_srch.php.
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room revenue, the dataset includes basic information including hotel name, address,
and capacity. The raw dataset spans the period between Jan. 2003 and Aug. 2014.
Interestingly, according to Texas law, “a hotel is considered to be any building
in which members of the public rent sleeping accommodations for $15 or more per
day.”34 For this reason, revenue from Airbnb properties (as well as various other
vacation rental options) whose owners are in compliance with the Texas tax code is
also reported in this dataset. This is evident from Figure 3·1, which plots the number
of unique tax-paying properties in Austin broken down by capacity, i.e., maximum
occupancy. We conjecture that the rapid increase in low capacity properties starting
in 2008 is related to Airbnb’s entry into the Texas market at the same time. To
exclude non-hotel properties from our analysis of the impact on hotels, we cross-
reference the Texas Comptroller dataset with the U.S. hotel census data provided to
us by STR. The STR census includes all U.S. hotels and contains a rich attribute
set for each hotel, including its opening date, price segment, capacity, operation
type (chain vs. independent), and geographic location. In total, the STR dataset
contains information on 3, 747 hotels in Texas metropolitan areas. After linking the
STR census dataset with the Texas tax dataset, we obtain high-confidence matches
for a panel of 3, 047 properties (81% of STR hotels, which account for over 90% of
the revenue in our data).
Airbnb can a↵ect hotel room revenue through lower occupancy rates, decreased
hotel room prices, or a combination of these two factors, conventionally reported
within the hotel and hospitality industry as RevPAR (revenue per available room),
which is the product of average room price and occupancy. Because the data we
obtained from the Comptroller’s o ce does not report either occupancy rates or
hotel room prices, we obtain additional data on these quantities for a subset of
Texas hotels from STR. The room price (also referred to as average daily rate, or
34See http://www.window.state.tx.us/taxinfo/hotel/faqhotel.html.
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Figure 3·1: Annual counts of Austin properties that pay hotel occu-
pancy tax, broken down by capacity.
ADR in the industry) and occupancy rate data from STR covers a subset of 2, 584
hotels in Texas who chose to report this information to STR over the same time
period (Jan. 2003 to Aug. 2014).
Finally, we assemble a set of control variables derived from publicly available
sources. We obtain monthly unemployment data at the city level, and annual de-
mographic information at the county level from the BLS at bls.gov and the U.S.
Census Bureau at census.gov.
3.3 Empirical Strategy
Airbnb has seen widely varying degrees of traction within di↵erent local, regional and
international markets, both with respect to initial market entry and the rate at which
it has been adopted within markets. For example, consider Figure 3·2, which depicts
the current extent of market penetration both of Airbnb properties and hotels within
the state of Texas (top panels), and within the county encompassing the state capital,
Austin (bottom panels). Unlike hotels, which have coverage throughout the state,
and pockets of local density, such as in downtown Austin, Airbnb has spotty coverage
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Table 3.1: Airbnb’s spatial and temporal penetration. Cumulative
counts of Airbnb listings per year in the ten most populous Texas
cities.
Houston San Antonio Dallas Austin Ft. Worth El Paso Arlington Corpus Christi Plano Laredo
(Pop.) 2.16M 1.38M 1.24M 0.84M 0.78M 0.67M 0.38M 0.31M 0.27M 0.24M
2008 1 9 0 25 0 0 0 0 0 0
2009 6 13 7 146 2 0 1 0 0 0
2010 39 22 23 468 10 0 3 0 1 0
2011 169 72 109 1,862 34 3 19 7 5 1
2012 425 171 271 5,158 68 8 27 24 20 1
2013 695 271 422 7,489 93 23 36 49 33 1
2014 891 346 526 8,575 114 31 52 60 44 2
at best throughout the state, but broader coverage across metro areas, including
suburbs and exurbs. Table 3.1 reveals that patterns of Airbnb adoption, over the
past eight years in the ten most populous cities in Texas, are themselves diverse, with
several cities experiencing early adoption and rapid growth, while others experienced
minimal Airbnb adoption. Our empirical strategy exploits this variability to identify
the impact of Airbnb’s rise on hotel room revenue using a di↵erences-in-di↵erences
(DD) identification strategy. Specifically, we estimate Airbnb’s impact on hotel room
revenue by comparing changes in hotel room revenue before and after Airbnb enters
a specific city, against a baseline of changes in hotel room revenue in cities with no
Airbnb presence over the same period time.
The key identification assumption we have to make to support a causal interpre-
tation of this DD estimate is that there are no unobserved, time-varying, city-specific
factors that are correlated with both Airbnb entry and hotel room revenue. Stated
di↵erently, we assume that unobserved factors that could potentially jointly a↵ect
both Airbnb adoption and hotel room revenue do not systematically vary both be-
tween di↵erent cities and over time. For instance, the following unobserved factors
are accounted for in our estimate and do not bias our estimates: 1) city-specific time-
invariant di↵erences in adoption rates (e.g., consumers in Austin overall being more
likely to adopt Airbnb than consumers in Dallas); 2) factors that vary arbitrarily over
time but do not vary across cities (e.g., a generally increasing awareness of Airbnb
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Figure 3·2: Geographical distribution of hotels and Airbnb listings in
the state of Texas (top) and in Travis County, TX (bottom) in 2013.
shared across all consumers in Texas over time), and, 3) city-specific trends, which
allow for unobserved confounders that vary both between cities and over time ac-
cording to a pre-specified functional form (linear or quadratic). Our DD specification
takes the following form:
log Hotel Revenueikt =   log Airbnb Supplykt + hi + ⌧t +X
0
ikt  + ✏ikt. (3.1)
The dependent variable is the log of monthly room revenue of hotel i in city k at
time t. To implement the DD strategy, our model includes hotel fixed e↵ects hi,
and time (year-month) fixed e↵ects ⌧t. The first di↵erence is taken using the hotel
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fixed e↵ects, which allow for time-invariant di↵erences in hotel room revenue between
treated hotels (i.e., hotels in cities with an Airbnb presence) and non-treated hotels
(i.e., hotels in cities with no Airbnb presence). The second di↵erence in our DD
specification is taken over time using year-month fixed e↵ects ⌧t which allow for
unobserved time-varying revenue di↵erences that are common across di↵erent cities.
The coe cient of interest is  , which has the usual DD interpretation: it is an
estimate of the percentage change in hotel room revenue in Airbnb-adopting cities
subsequent to Airbnb’s entry compared against a baseline of changes in hotel room
revenue over the same time period in cities where Airbnb does not have a presence.
We now discuss and motivate the specific form of the specification and the controls
we use, as well as the other best-practice methodologies from the literature that we
employ, in carrying out this empirical identification strategy.
First, an identification challenge we face is that increased demand for accom-
modation is likely correlated with increases in both Airbnb supply and hotel room
supply. Concretely, it is plausible that over our decade-long observation period, hotel
firms have been strategically developing new properties in areas of anticipated high
demand. This pattern of competition could bias our estimation because city-specific
increases in hotel room supply can also drive per-hotel room revenue down, while at
the same time correlate with increased Airbnb adoption. To guard against this type
of concern, we construct a control variable Hotel Room Supply ikt, which measures
the total supply of hotel rooms in the same city as hotel i (but excluding hotel i itself,
thus the  i in the subscript), for each time t. This control, which we also incorporate
in Xikt, allows for increases in the supply of hotel rooms provided by competitors
to impact the room revenue of each hotel in our data, much as we hypothesize an
increase in Airbnb rooms does.
Second, as we explained earlier, our DD estimate will be biased if there exist
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unobserved factors that vary across cities and over time, and which jointly influence
Airbnb entry and hotel room revenue. To further guard against this possibility,
we allow for quadratic city-specific trends as a control in Xikt. The inclusion of
these trends relaxes the DD assumption of no cross-city time-varying unobservables
that are correlated with both Airbnb supply and hotel revenue. A concern with
the inclusion of city-specific time-trends is that they can be confounded with hotels’
response to Airbnb (Wolfers, 2006). Fortunately, our dataset covers a long pre-Airbnb
period from 2003 to 2008, allowing us to estimate these trends on a large sample of
pre-treatment observations. In addition, to ensure that our results are robust to
alternative functional forms for the city-specific time trends we also estimate all
subsequent models using linear instead of quadratic trends. Using linear trends, we
obtain (but do not report for brevity) similar results.
A final issue that we have to deal with is that the unit of analysis is hotel monthly
room revenue, but the treatment, Airbnb adoption, occurs at the city level. As is
well known, this mismatch in the level at which we measure our dependent variable
compared to the treatment variable can result in understating the standard error
of the estimate of Airbnb’s impact, because it is likely that hotel room revenue is
serially correlated over time within a city. We correct for this mismatch by clustering
standard errors at the city level, which lets us account for possible serial correlation
in hotel room revenue. In so doing, we follow the standard practice in the literature
for analyzing panel data in a DD setting (see e.g., the treatment recommended
by Bertrand et al. (2004), as well as Donald and Lang (2007)). We report standard
errors clustered at the city level for all subsequent regressions.
3.3.1 Identification checks
Before proceeding with estimation, we conduct a series of identification checks to
assess whether our proposed empirical strategy can recover Airbnb’s causal impact
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on hotel room revenue. Our DD identification strategy relies on randomness in
Airbnb adoption with respect to unobserved city-specific time-varying factors (✏ikt)
that are also correlated with changes in hotel room revenue (conditional on the
control variables we include). As with any study relying on observational data, there
is no conclusive test of this assumption. However, we can exploit the richness of our
data to check if this assumption is likely to hold in practice. Similar to Akerman
et al. (2013), we perform two checks that support the basis for our key identification
assumption.
First, we show that most variation in Airbnb adoption is explained by regressing
(the log of) Airbnb supply on time-invariant city-specific factors, time fixed e↵ects,
and city-specific trends – all of which are part of the DD model. These factors explain
95% of the variation in Airbnb adoption, suggesting that our modeling assumption
has a sound basis in practice. Next, we repeat this regression with the addition of
city-specific time-varying observables that could potentially be correlated with hotel
room revenue: population, unemployment rate, and employment in the accommoda-
tion sector. The inclusion of these factors does not increase the explanatory power of
the regression. These analyses suggest that little variation in Airbnb supply remains
unexplained, and thus could potentially be correlated with the error term in our DD
regression.
Second, we check whether pre-treatment city characteristics predict future Airbnb
supply, where the time of treatment is taken to be 2008, when Airbnb entered the
Texas market. The idea behind this test is that assuming Airbnb adoption is ex-
ogenous (with respect to hotel performance), it should not be correlated with pre-
treatment factors. To perform this identification check, for each city, we compute
its most recent pre-treatment (2007) population, unemployment rate, employment
in the accommodation sector, hotel room supply, hotel room prices, and hotel occu-
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pancy rates. We then interact these pre-determined factors (Zk,2007) with a vector
of post-treatment year-month fixed e↵ects (⌧t), and regress them on Airbnb supply.
Concretely, with the units of analysis being post-2007 city-months, we estimate:
log Airbnb Supplykt = Cityk + (⌧t ⇥ Zk,2007)0 ✓ + ekt. (3.2)
Each coe cient in the vector of coe cients ✓ is interpreted as a correlation between
a specific pre-treatment characteristic and Airbnb adoption in each post-treatment
period (from January 2008 onwards). Figure 3·3 presents the estimated coe cients ✓
for each characteristic together with their 95% confidence intervals. The only signif-
icant association we find is between pre-Airbnb population and subsequent Airbnb
adoption, and, for this reason, we include population as a control in all our spec-
ifications. Visually, there also appears to be a weak correlation with pre-Airbnb
unemployment rate, possibly driven by the help Airbnb can provide to struggling
or unemployed homeowners in paying their mortgage,35 though nearly all individual
correlation coe cients making up this trend are not statistically di↵erent from zero.
Regardless, we also include county-level unemployment rates as a control in Equa-
tion 3.1. Beyond these associations, we find no other discernible trend in the remain-
ing coe cients (whose 95% confidence intervals always include the zero point, or, no
e↵ect). It is especially reassuring that the pre-treatment hotel industry structure –
as captured by hotel room supply, occupancy rates, room prices, and accommodation
sector employment in 2007 – do not predict Airbnb supply from 2008 onwards.
As mentioned earlier, one cannot entirely rule out endogeneity concerns in a
study using observational data. Here, we have shown that various factors potentially
a↵ecting hotel room revenue, including demographic trends, as well as the structure
and performance of the hospitality industry across di↵erent cities, are not correlated
35See “How Airbnb helps users save their homes”, August 2012, http://fortune.com/2012/
08/16/how-airbnb-helps-users-save-their-homes/.
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with local patterns of Airbnb adoption. These checks increase our confidence that
the identification assumptions needed to estimate Airbnb’s causal impact on hotel
room revenue hold in our data.
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Figure 3·3: Correlation between Airbnb supply and pre-Airbnb (year
2007) city characteristics, with 95% confidence intervals.
3.3.2 Results and Economic Significance
We report the results of estimating Equation 3.1 in the first column of Table 3.2. We
estimate the coe cient   =  0.034, or equivalently, a 10% increase in Airbnb list-
ings is associated with a statistically significant 0.34% (p < 0.01) decrease in monthly
hotel room revenue. As we stated earlier regarding the interpretation of a negative
coe cient  , this estimate indicates that Airbnb listings result in some Airbnb stays
that are a substitute for hotel stays in cities with an established Airbnb presence.
Then, in column 2 of Table 3.2 we incorporate the control variables discussed in the
previous section. While the estimated coe cients for these controls have the signs
and magnitudes we would expect (e.g., increased hotel room supply and unemploy-
ment are both associated with decreased hotel room revenue), our estimates for the
impact of Airbnb remain qualitatively unchanged, a 10% increase in Airbnb supply
is associated with a 0.37% decrease in monthly hotel room revenue.
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The economic significance of our estimates is best understood in the context of
Airbnb’s growth. For instance, in Austin, the city in Texas with the highest Airbnb
penetration, we estimate that the impact of Airbnb over the past 5 years is roughly
10% of hotel room revenue (the calculation is based on an increase in Airbnb supply
from approximately 450 listings in 2010 to over 8,500 listings in 2014 yielding a
revenue impact of 1   (8, 500/450) 0.037 = 0.102). Considering the high fixed costs
associated with operating a hotel, this figure could represent a significant fraction
of hotel profits. Another way to see the economic significance of Airbnb is through
a direct comparison of Airbnb and hotel room supply. These currently substantial
impacts are all the more striking in light of the fact that Airbnb continues to grow
rapidly, including in cities like Austin, where it already has an established presence.
Furthermore, larger markets in Texas such as Houston and Dallas appear to have
ample room for Airbnb growth, due to their large population, and relatively low
Airbnb penetration to date. Therefore, our results suggest the risk to incumbent
hotels from Airbnb as a market entrant is both measurable and increasing.
An alternative way to assess the economic significance of these results is by com-
paring the estimated coe cients for the impact of increased Airbnb supply and hotel
room supply on hotel room revenue. Our results in the second column of Table 3.2
show that a 10% increase in the supply of hotel rooms in Texas is associated with
a roughly 1.5% decrease in Texas hotel room revenue, while a corresponding 10%
increase in Airbnb supply is associated with a smaller 0.37% decrease in Texas hotel
room revenue. It makes intuitive sense that increasing Airbnb supply has a smaller
impact than increasing hotel room supply, as we do not expect all Airbnb stays to
substitute for a hotel room stay. Nevertheless, the two e↵ects are surprisingly com-
parable in size: an increase in Airbnb supply has one-fourth the negative revenue
impact of a corresponding increase in hotel room supply. Taken at face value, this
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Table 3.2: Di↵erence-in-di↵erences estimates of the impact of Airbnb on hotel room
revenue, prices, and occupancy rates. The first four columns report estimates using data
from the Texas Comptroller’s o ce; the last two from STR.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue Occupancy rate Room price
log Airbnb Supply  0.034***  0.037***  0.041***  0.007**  0.019***
( 3.02) ( 3.72) ( 3.56) ( 2.03) ( 2.95)
Airbnb Supply (ref. zero listings)
1 to 99 Listings  0.016
( 0.94)
100 to 999 Listings  0.047*
( 1.69)
1000+ Listings  0.083**
( 2.27)
log Hotel Room Supply  0.154***  0.146***  0.151***  0.246***  0.046***
( 6.82) ( 6.28) ( 6.50) ( 8.19) ( 3.32)
Unemployment Rate  0.060***  0.060***  0.058***  0.031***  0.009
( 3.99) ( 3.43) ( 3.66) ( 3.20) ( 1.42)
log Population  0.036 0.035 0.028  0.032 0.118
( 0.20) (0.25) (0.14) ( 0.39) (1.61)
CEM Sample No No Yes No No No
N 266283 266283 167968 266283 256705 256705
R2 within 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.35
Note: The dependent variable is log Hotel Revenueikt in columns 1-4, Occupancy rateikt in column 5
and log Hotel Room Priceikt in column 6. Cluster-robust t-statistics (at the city level) are shown in
parentheses. All specifications include hotel and time fixed e↵ects, and a city-specific quadratic time
trend.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
suggests that incremental Texas Airbnb inventory does weakly substitute for incre-
mental hotel inventory. And, although the impact of additional Airbnb supply is not
as large, the significantly higher marginal costs associated with increasing hotel room
supply, makes hotels less likely to be able to expand inventory as rapidly. We explore
substitution between Airbnb and specific hotel types in more detail in Section 2.5,
where we seek to understand the mechanisms behind Airbnb’s impact.
3.3.3 Robustness checks
To further reinforce the causal interpretation of our DD estimate, in this subsection
we perform two additional checks: a matching method, which we use as a more
stringent alternative in defining (otherwise similar) treated and untreated properties,
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and a specification test using an alternative functional form of Airbnb supply.
Since Airbnb adoption is clearly not random by design, to provide evidence in
support of the DD identification assumptions, we showed that observed pre-treatment
demographic and market characteristics do not correlate with the patterns of Airbnb
adoption we observe in our data, which is what we would expect with exogenous
Airbnb entry. Here, we combine DD with matching to further limit the potential for
unobserved confounders biasing our estimates. To explain the matching approach,
first recall our source of identification: roughly speaking, for each “treated” hotel, i.e.,
a hotel a↵ected by Airbnb competition, our DD analysis constructs a counterfactual
outcome using a set of “untreated” hotels, i.e., hotels una↵ected by Airbnb. The
intuition behind matching is that the more similar treated and untreated hotels
are in their observed characteristics, the less likely they are to di↵er in unobserved
ways, including bias-inducing factors. Matching methods aim to reduce endogeneity
concerns by ensuring comparability between treated and untreated units (Heckman
and Navarro-Lozano, 2004). While various matching methods exist, here we use
the Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) procedure (Iacus et al., 2012), because it is
intuitive and works well with categorical data (like most hotel characteristics).
CEM takes places in two steps. First, hotels are stratified based on observed
characteristics; we use price segment (Budget to Luxury), operation (independent or
chain), and hotel chain a liation (e.g., Hilton, or Marriott), if any. After this first
step, each stratum contains hotels that are identical on the basis of these character-
istics. For instance, a single stratum contains all Upscale Marriott hotels, some of
which are eventually treated and some of which are not. In a setting with a binary
treatment indicator, it is clear which units are eventually treated. In our case, where
treatment intensity varies, we make the distinction between treated and untreated
hotels by defining hotels in cities which see no Airbnb penetration by the end of our
85
observation period as untreated, and the remaining hotels as treated. One could ar-
gue that this definition of treatment is too permissive; while we do not present these
results for brevity, we found our CEM analysis to be robust to alternative definitions
of treated units, such as hotels in cities that eventually have at least 100 Airbnb
listings. In the second step of CEM, we discard strata containing only treated or
untreated hotels, and re-normalize weights of observations in the remaining strata to
place equal weight on treated and untreated units in each stratum. Applying CEM to
our data leaves us with 1, 946 hotels.36 Finally, we re-estimate the DD specification
in Equation 3.1 on the subset of matched hotels using the CEM weights. Concep-
tually, DD on the CEM sample estimates a treatment e↵ect within each stratum of
comparable treated and untreated hotels, then averages these treatment e↵ects to
arrive at a final estimate. We report this estimate in the third column of Table 3.2.
We find that the e↵ect of Airbnb on hotel room revenue is robust to CEM, attaining
a magnitude ( 0.041, p < .01) that is nearly identical to our main analysis.
The second robustness check we perform guards against a functional specification
concern in Equation 3.1: regressing the log of Airbnb supply on the log of hotel room
revenue implicitly assumes a constant elasticity relationship between the two quan-
tities. While this might be a reasonable assumption in data with limited variation
in Airbnb supply, the constant elasticity assumption is likely violated in our setting,
as it is implausible that doubling Airbnb supply from 1 to 2 units will have the same
e↵ect on hotel room revenue as doubling Airbnb supply from 100 to 200 units. To
ensure that our results are not driven by this modeling choice, we model Airbnb
supply non-parametrically using a categorical variable, which takes on one of the
following (roughly log-binned) values: 0 Airbnb units, 1-99 Airbnb units, 100-999
36CEM entails a trade-o↵ between matching granularity, and the number of discarded observa-
tions. We chose our matching criteria to strike a reasonable balance between ensuring units within
each stratum are similar, and discarding too many observations. Our results our robust to alternate
matching criteria.
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Airbnb units, 1000+ Airbnb units. Specifically, we estimate:
log Hotel Revenueikt =  1I(Airbnb Supply 1-99)kt (3.3)
+ 2I(Airbnb Supply 100-999)kt
+ 3I(Airbnb Supply 1000+)kt
+hi + ⌧t +X
0
ikt  + ✏ikt,
where the I(.) are dummy indicators for the corresponding ranges of Airbnb supply.
This model allows for the e↵ect of Airbnb to vary depending on the number of
Airbnb listings present in each city during a given period. In addition, it provides
easier to interpret estimates compared to the log-log estimates of Equation 3.1. In
this model, each of three estimated coe cients associated with the three levels of
the categorical Airbnb supply variable we use represents a percentage change in
hotel revenue. We estimate this model by replacing Airbnb supply with this new
categorical variable in Equation 3.1 using zero Airbnb units as the reference level. We
present our results in the fourth column of Table 3.2. These estimates provide directly
interpretable estimates of Airbnb’s economic impact. We find that increasing levels
of Airbnb penetration have proportionally larger impacts on hotel room revenue,
as we would expect. For example, at Airbnb adoption rates exceeding 1000 rooms,
the estimate ( 0.083, p < .05), indicates (since we are now working with a log-level
specification) an average impact of 8.3% on hotel room revenue. These estimates are
in line with our previous estimates in Section 3.3.2. Moreover, it is also reassuring
that we find no statistically significant e↵ect at low levels of Airbnb supply. This
robustness check suggests that we are not identifying the Airbnb treatment e↵ect
from variation at low rates of Airbnb supply, which one would expect to have a
negligible impact on hotel room revenue.
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3.3.4 How A↵ected Hotels Respond to Airbnb
We now turn to the question of responses by incumbent hotels to Airbnb market
entry. Patterns of response and novel response mechanisms by traditional incumbents
to entrants facilitated by online technology are of increasing focus (Seamans and Zhu,
2013; Kroft and Pope, 2014); we add to this literature.
We investigate whether hotels actively respond to Airbnb market entry through
a price response. Recall that hotel room revenue is the product of two quantities:
average occupancy rate within a given time period, and average daily room price
(ADR) during that same period of time. We now separate the impact from Airbnb on
hotel room revenue into two components: the e↵ect due to reductions in occupancy
and the e↵ect due to pricing, as captured by changes in the average daily rate.
A hotel that exerts no response to a supply shock would exhibit a reduction in
occupancy, whereas alternatively, a manager could maintain occupancy levels via a
price response. A key di↵erence between the two responses is that the latter, reduced
prices, is a net benefit for all consumers seeking accommodations, whether they use
Airbnb or not.
To estimate these component-wise e↵ects, we re-estimate the DD specification
in Equation 3.1, substituting the dependent variable first with occupancy rate, and
then with the log of ADR. Similar to the room revenue analysis, these two quantities
vary by hotel and by month. We report these results in the final two columns of
Table 3.2. As reported in the fifth column of this table, we find a statistically
significant (p < 0.05) connection between increased Airbnb listings and occupancy
rate. The coe cient suggests that a 10% increase in Airbnb supply generates a
modest decrease in occupancy rate of about 0.0007%. (Note that, in contrast to
our other dependent variables, occupancy rate is already expressed as a percentage
and therefore we do not log transform it. Therefore, the coe cient of this regression
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has a level-log interpretation.) In column 6, we regress against ADR, and we find
that a 10% increase in Airbnb supply is associated with a statistically significant
(p < 0.01) price decrease of 0.19%. This suggests that a↵ected hotels experience a
decrease in occupancy rate due to Airbnb entry, to which they actively respond by
lowering their prices. Note that this behavior is consistent with basic hotel revenue
management practices, where hotels set prices accordingly to the level of occupancy
rates observed.37 To understand the economic significance of these results we can
repeat the same calculation performed in Section 3.3.2, which suggests that in Austin,
Airbnb negatively impacted hotel prices by roughly 5.4%.
3.4 Mechanisms
3.4.1 Which hotels are most a↵ected and why?
We have provided evidence that treating hotels homogeneously, Airbnb has a nega-
tive impact on hotel room revenue in Texas. In this section, we investigate various
mechanisms through which Airbnb could exhibit heterogeneous impacts across dif-
ferent types of hotels. To motivate this analysis, we observe that while Airbnb can
surely sometimes provide an alternative to hotels, one can hardly expect it to be a
perfect substitute for all travel needs. As Airbnb has its roots in casual stays, in-
cluding those involving shared accommodations, we expect it to be a less attractive
option for those who are not on a budget. Specifically, business travelers whose hotel
expenses will be reimbursed and vacationers who frequent high-end hotels are two
examples of consumers we view as much less likely to substitute a hotel stay with an
Airbnb stay. Moreover, business travelers make greater use of those business-related
hotel amenities not typically provided by Airbnb properties. Following this logic, we
further isolate the impact of Airbnb on hotel room revenue by partitioning hotels in
37Indeed, the hospitality industry has high fixed-costs and low marginal-costs, and therefore the
general thinking is that it’s better to put a head in a bed – at a low price – than not at all.
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two di↵erent ways, each dividing hotels into one class that we expect to be less vul-
nerable to Airbnb’s entry and another class that we expect to be more vulnerable,
then estimating this additional interaction e↵ect in our original DD specification.
First, we segment hotels by price tier. Recall that the STR hotel census divides
hotels into five price tiers: Budget, Economy, Midprice, Upscale, Luxury. Second,
we di↵erentiate hotels by their customer base: those that target business travelers
versus those that do not.
To estimate heterogeneous treatment e↵ects, we estimate a new specification
that adds an interaction e↵ect between hotel types and Airbnb supply to the DD
specification in Equation 3.1:
log Hotel Revenueikt = 1log Airbnb Supplykt (3.4)
+  2log Airbnb Supplykt ⇥ Hotel Typei
+X 0ikt  + ↵i + ⌧t + ✏ikt.
The coe cients of interest are  2, which captures the di↵erential impact of Airbnb
on the various segmentations by hotel type that we investigate. Specifically, follow-
ing the segmentations described above, we first define Hotel Typei as a categorical
variable identifying each one of the hotel price segments used by STR. In the sec-
ond analysis, we use a binary indicator of whether hotel i has conference or meeting
space.
The results of these analyses appear in first two columns of Table 3.3. We start
with price segmentation, presented in the first column. We estimate Equation 3.4,
interacting hotel price segments with Airbnb supply. Here, we use Luxury hotels
as a reference category least una↵ected by Airbnb, motivated by two factors: these
hotels are least comparable to Airbnb based on price and also that these upmarket
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hotels provide amenities (e.g., pools, conference rooms, concierge) to travelers that
typical Airbnb rentals do not. Note that this choice of reference category does not
a↵ect our results.
We find the negative impact of Airbnb increasing as we step down price tiers, with
statistically significant interaction coe cient estimates at the 1% level for each of the
three lowest tiers (Midprice, Economy, and Budget). In contrast, we find only a small
negative and insignificant e↵ect for the Upscale and Luxury segment (the latter being
the reference level, and hence being captured by the main e↵ect). From a managerial
standpoint, this result has direct import: even though lower-end hotels in Texas
account for a disproportionately small amount of room revenue as compared with
upmarket hotels, they nevertheless bear the brunt of the impact of the market entry of
Airbnb. Our evidence suggests that consumers are increasingly substituting Airbnb
stays for lower-end hotels in Texas, possibly identifying the former as o↵ering better
value at a similar price point. While this increased competition a↵ords consumers
greater choice, it also places lower-end hotels in regions with high Airbnb penetration
at greater risk.
In column two of Table 3.3 we report the results of the segmentation of hotels
catering to business travelers. We use those hotels having conference and meeting
space as the reference category. The estimated coe cient  2 for the interaction
between Airbnb supply and the absence of meeting space indicator is negative and
statistically significant ( 0.015, p < .01), suggesting that hotels lacking business
facilities are more a↵ected by Airbnb. These results are consistent with Airbnb’s
marketing strategy thus far, which has primarily targeted vacation travel. However,
seeing a growth opportunity in the business travel segment, Airbnb recently launched
an initiative to attract more business travelers.38 An interesting open question going
38See: http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/28/airbnb-expands-into-business-
travel/.
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forward is the extent to which business travel will continue to di↵erentiate the impact
of Airbnb on hotels.
A separate distinction that we explore, relating to hotel operation rather than
consumer behavior, is between chain hotels (including franchises) and independent
hotels. Unlike independent hotels, chain hotels allocate large marketing budgets to
advertising, brand building, guest loyalty programs, and other tactics which should
make them less vulnerable to competition. In addition, chains provide a more pre-
dictable standard of service, which further di↵erentiates them from both Airbnb and
independent hotels. We present this analysis in the third column of Table 3.3, using
chain hotels as a reference level. The overall e↵ect due to Airbnb remains negative
and statistically significant ( 0.035, p < .01), suggesting that hotels of all operation
structures were a↵ected. However, the estimated interaction coe cient for indepen-
dent hotels ( 0.01, p < .01) is also negative and statistically significant, suggesting
that Airbnb has indeed had a slightly larger impact on independent hotels.
Overall, we find that independent hotels, hotels that do not cater to business
travelers, and lower-end hotels are all more heavily a↵ected by Airbnb than our re-
spective reference categories, hotels without these characteristics. While these results
help us better understand the most vulnerable hotel segments, and are certainly of
importance to hoteliers, they also serve as a robustness check in that the heteroge-
neous substitution e↵ects they reveal align with the e↵ects we hypothesized based
on the value proposition to consumers that Airbnb o↵ers.
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Table 3.3: Di↵erence-in-di↵erences estimates of heterogeneity in Airbnb’s impact
on hotel room revenue.
(1) (2) (3)
Price segment Business travel Operation
log Airbnb Supply  0.014  0.031***  0.035***
( 1.28) ( 3.03) ( 3.48)
Budget ⇥ log Airbnb Supply  0.039***
( 4.67)
Economy ⇥ log Airbnb Supply  0.032***
( 7.92)
Midprice ⇥ log Airbnb Supply  0.019***
( 4.65)
Upscale ⇥ log Airbnb Supply  0.008
( 1.57)
w/o Meeting Space ⇥ log Airbnb Supply  0.015***
( 4.16)
Independent ⇥ log Airbnb Supply  0.010***
( 2.91)
log Hotel Room Supply  0.155***  0.155***  0.154***
( 6.96) ( 6.89) ( 6.85)
Unemployment Rate  0.060***  0.060***  0.060***
( 3.96) ( 3.97) ( 3.96)
log Population  0.001  0.027  0.038
( 0.01) ( 0.15) ( 0.21)
N 266283 266283 266283
R2 within 0.24 0.24 0.24
Note: The dependent variable is log Hotel Revenueikt. Cluster-robust t-statistics (at the city
level) are shown in parentheses. All specifications include hotel and time fixed e↵ects, and a
city-specific quadratic time trend.
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Chapter 4
Discussion and conclusions
In the last two decades, technological advances facilitated the creation of diverse,
large, and geographically dispersed online markets. Online markets generated several
benefits for both consumers and firms. However, along with new opportunities, the
rise of online marketplaces created new challenges. In this thesis, we analyzed two
key issues surrounding online markets in the context of the hotel industry.
4.1 Managing brand reputation
In Chapter 2, we study the Texas hotel industry, and we show that, on average, hotels
that use management responses see a 0.12-star increase in their TripAdvisor ratings
when they begin responding to reviewers. To explain this finding, we hypothesize
that management responses increase the cost of leaving a negative review, while
decreasing the cost of leaving a positive one. We empirically support this hypothesis
by showing that following the adoption of management responses, negative reviews
become longer (i.e., costlier to produce), overall review volume increases, and hotels
attract reviewers who are inherently more positive in their evaluations.
Our findings have economic and managerial implications for hotels, consumers,
and review platforms. As far as hotels are concerned, our results indicate that man-
agement responses are an e↵ective reputation management strategy. Further, this
strategy is sanctioned by review platforms, and it can directly impact the financial
performance of firms that use it (Luca, 2011). One downside of responding is that
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hotels are more likely to attract fewer but more detailed negative reviews from guests
who are trying harder to substantiate their complaints knowing that hotels will scru-
tinize their feedback. This highlights an interesting trade-o↵ for managers. Our own
experience as consumers, often focusing on reading negative reviews first, suggests
that the risks in longer negative reviews may in some instances outweigh the benefits
of an increased ratings. Quantifying these trade-o↵s is an interesting area for future
research.
The benefits of management responses for consumers and review platforms are less
obvious. On one hand, by opening up a communication channel to consumers, review
platforms encourage hotels to engage with their guests, to inform future visitors of
steps they have taken to correct issues reported in prior reviews, and to create a richer
information environment that should in principle help consumers make better choices.
Further, as we have shown, management responses can encourage review creation.
Therefore, management responses can help review platforms grow their collection of
reviews. On the other hand, our work shows that opening up this communication
channel has the undesired consequence of negative review underreporting, which
creates a positive bias in the ratings of responding hotels.
Our results may also raise a concern for review platforms that do not allow re-
sponding, or for platforms like Expedia on which hotels tend not to respond. As we
have shown, management responses lead to more reviews. But, where do these re-
views come from? One possibility is that reviewers who would not have otherwise left
a review, now choose to leave one. A more intriguing hypothesis is that management
responses result in cross-platform substitution: reviewers migrate from platforms
without management responses to platforms with management responses because
they are more likely to be heard in the latter, i.e., to maximize the impact of their
reviews. Fully understanding the mechanism that drives review volume increases
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following the adoption of management responses is an interesting open question.
Taken together, our results in this study highlight an information design problem:
how can review platforms enable the interaction of firms and consumers without in-
troducing reporting bias? While it is beyond the scope of this work to provide an
exhaustive list of alternative designs, other practical schemes to consider include re-
sponding to consumers privately, and management responses that are not attached to
specific reviews. The evaluation and implementation of these and other information
design schemes is a direction for future research.
A potential limitation of our analysis is that we focus on estimating a treatment
e↵ect on the treated. Therefore, our work does not answer the question of what the
impact of using management responses would be on the reputation of randomly cho-
sen hotel. In practice, the treatment e↵ect could be significantly di↵erent for hotels
that do not currently respond to their reviews. We speculate that this is unlikely to
be the case, given that our analysis indicates that the primary driver of improved
reputation is a change in reviewer behavior, rather than any particular hotel char-
acteristic. Nevertheless, we caution that the possibility remains that management
responses could a↵ect the reviewing habits of the guests of non-responding hotels
in di↵erent ways. Therefore, our findings should not be interpreted as a definite
prescription for improving a firm’s online reputation. A randomized field experiment
is a promising path forward in estimating any di↵erence between the ATT and the
ATE.
A second limitation of our work is that we solely focus on the decision of hotel
managers to begin responding to consumer reviews. Managers who are consider-
ing responding to consumer reviews face a complex decision problem that involves
choosing which reviews to respond to, when to respond to them, and how to respond.
Future work can combine econometric methods with natural language processing to
96
analyze the textual content of reviews and management responses to estimate het-
erogeneity in the treatment e↵ect arising from the various ways businesses handle
praise and complaints. Such analyses can yield prescriptive guidelines for managers
looking to communicate with consumers in di↵erent customer service scenarios.
Online reviews have been thoroughly studied in the marketing, management, and
computer science literatures, and they are now understood to be a significant driver
of consumer behavior. By comparison, existing research has overlooked management
responses despite their wide adoption by managers. In this study, we took a first
step in narrowing this gap by showing that management responses can shape online
reputation. We also found that more than half of the hotels we studied now respond
to their reviews, up from only 7% five years ago. Given the increasing number of
firms that wish to engage with their reviewers and to actively participate in the
production of information that molds their online reputation, we look forward to
seeing more research in this direction.
4.2 The sharing economy vs. traditional industries
In Chapter 3, we study the pattern of competition between a subset of peer-to-peer
online markets known as the sharing economy and traditional firms.
The sharing economy has recently emerged as a viable alternative to fulfilling
a variety of consumer needs, ranging from prepared meals to cars to overnight ac-
commodations, that were previously provided primarily by firms rather than en-
trepreneurial individuals. As the size of the sharing economy has grown, so has the
magnitude of its economic impacts. Our work is among the first to provide empirical
evidence that the sharing economy is significantly changing consumption patterns,
as opposed to generating purely incremental economic activity, as has been argued
in prior work. Focusing on the case of Airbnb, a pioneer in shared accommodations,
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we estimate that its entry into the Texas market has had a quantifiable negative
impact on local hotel room revenue. The substitution patterns we observe strongly
suggest that Airbnb provides a viable, but imperfect, alternative for certain tradi-
tional types of overnight accommodation. Our analyses pinpoint lower-end hotels,
and hotels not catering to business travelers, as those that are most vulnerable to
increased competition from rentals enabled by firms like Airbnb.
Our work has some limitations which could be addressed in future work. First,
one must recognize that our findings are representative of the state of Texas; directly
generalizing them to other markets may not be appropriate given the varying of dy-
namics of supply and demand for accommodation across di↵erent regional markets.
Additional studies which model the impact of Airbnb across these markets could be
a useful contribution.39 A second limitation of work is that we analyze properties
listed only on Airbnb, but not properties available through related vacation rental
platforms like HomeAway and VRBO. We do not believe that our results are signif-
icantly a↵ected by these competitors, since these firms primarily serve the smaller
vacation rental market; moreover, they have not experienced the extremely rapid
growth of Airbnb. Nevertheless, one could investigate the impact of all of these firms
in aggregate, or individually. A final limitation of our study pertains to the pre-
cise characterization of hotels’ response: here we have analyzed two metrics, price
and occupancy rate, that managers can invoke as a response in the short-term. On
longer time scales, hotels have other ways of responding to Airbnb, including promo-
tions, advertising, and even re-positioning to provide more personalized Airbnb-like
services. Mapping out the shape of hotels’ response remains an interesting open
39Indeed, following our study, others have arrived at similar estimates for Airbnb’s impact in
di↵erent markets. For example, Credit Suisse analysts used STR data to estimate that in New York
City, Jan. 2015 revenue per hotel room was 18.6% lower than a year ago. See “New York City hotel
rooms are getting cheaper thanks to Airbnb” at http://qz.com/341292/new-york-city-hotel-
rooms-are-getting-cheaper-thanks-to-airbnb/.
98
question.
Our results have direct implications for hotels, travelers, and policy makers. As
far as hotel managers are concerned, the competition their firms face from peer-to-
peer platforms has several unique features that di↵erentiate it from competition with
other firms. First, the Airbnb platform has near zero marginal cost, in that a new
room can be incrementally added to (or removed from) the platform with negligible
overhead. Because of this, Airbnb can scale supply in a near frictionless manner to
meet demand, even on short timescales. By contrast, increasing hotel room supply
involves buildout, causing significant marginal costs for hotel chains. Second, Airbnb
o↵ers a much wider range of products and services than hotels: Airbnb users can rent
anything from an apartment to a yurt. More importantly, because Airbnb leverages
existing housing inventory, it can potentially expand supply wherever houses and
apartment buildings already exist. This is in contrast to hotels, which must be built
at locations in accordance with local zoning requirements. Therefore, competition
by Airbnb is potentially harder for incumbents to adapt to, compared to competition
by other hotel firms.
Turning to consumers, we show that hotels in areas where Airbnb has an estab-
lished presence have responded to increased competition by lowering their prices,
which harms their revenue, but benefits travelers, even those who do not use Airbnb.
In addition to reduced prices, consumers also benefit from increased variety pro-
vided through peer-to-peer platforms. Furthermore, consumers on the supply side
benefit through additional income generated by providing goods and services via
peer-to-peer platforms.
Finally, our results have implications for policy makers. Municipal revenues rely
in part on tax receipts from well-regulated industries such as hotels and taxicabs.
With demand shifting away from these incumbent firms, and to the extent that
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regulation and taxation of peer-to-peer platforms proves to be more challenging,
the bottom line of cities with an established Airbnb presence could be hurt in the
short run. Of course, peer-to-peer platforms can also bring about increased demand,
which would directly benefit cities too, making the overall impact on cities harder to
measure. Quantifying the net impact of peer-to-peer platforms remains an interesting
direction for future research.
Returning to the thesis that the sharing economy has the potential to transfor-
matively increase social welfare, as evangelized by Botsman (2012) and others, we
assert that a large population of individuals worldwide have indeed benefited from
Airbnb: not only hosts that derive incremental income by renting properties through
Airbnb, and guests who select an Airbnb rental as an alternative to a hotel stay, but
also those consumers who benefit from lower prices and increased competition in the
accommodation industry. More broadly, our results should be viewed from outside
the confines of the accommodation industry. This more encompassing viewpoint can
weigh the positive change the sharing economy can bring about not only by provid-
ing imperfect substitutes for existing products, but also, through an application of
Say’s Law, by generating demand that did not previously exist through the supply
of new products and services. Harkening back to arguments Airbnb has made, the
supply of inexpensive accommodations can increase travel and tourism spend overall,
and thus, the sharing economy could be a net producer of new jobs. However, these
positives must be evaluated against various costs, including those estimated in this
paper. Our study represents an empirical first step into understanding the complex
set of issues surrounding the sharing economy. With the projected rapid growth of
the sharing economy, a host of related studies will be needed to fully understand and
reap its benefits.
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4.3 Final remarks
Online markets represent a fascinating area of research, and a growing body of lit-
erature investigates the ways in which these markets are a↵ecting the world around
us.
As demonstrated in this thesis, there are important challenges in studying online
markets. First, acquiring the right data is not easy. Often a unique source of data
is simply not enough. In both studies we presented, we collected information from
several sources including the Census Bureau, the Bureau of Labor Statistics and,
of course, the marketplaces we were studying. Additionally, when data is at hand,
preparing the data is a non trivial task in itself: many times the data collected is not
perfect and has to be cleaned and merged. Moreover, when the data is ready to be
analyzed, there are identification challenges that complicate causal inference. Most
of the time, either for technical or ethical reasons, it is not possible to prepare and run
a randomized experiment. This means that inferring causality requires combining
methods from econometrics and clever identification strategies.
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that online markets, as the past has
demonstrated, are in constant evolution. Airbnb, which started as a company tar-
geting more budget sensitive travelers, is rapidly changing and expanding its business.
For example, in 2015 Airbnb launched a version of its website completely dedicated
to business travelers, indicating the company’s intent to target new traveler sectors.40
Moreover, recently there has been evidence suggesting that Airbnb is starting to af-
fect luxury hotels, an impact not observed in our data.41 Therefore, future studies
might reach implications and conclusions that could be very di↵erent from what we
presented in this thesis.
40See: https://www.airbnb.com/business/signup.
41See: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-hotels-france-airbnb-
idUSKCN0QE0CO20150809.
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What we are certain about is that because of their dynamic nature, online mar-
kets are, and will continue to be, an interesting and fertile area of research. We
expect many more issues surrounding these markets to arise, which will create ample
opportunities for future research to develop new models and theories.
Appendix A
Airbnb
Figure A·1: A typical Airbnb user profile.
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Figure A·2: A typical Airbnb listing.
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